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Shaun Gallagher [167]Shaun Andrew Gallagher [1]
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Profile: Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis, University of Hertfordshire, University of Wollongong)
  1.  477 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher & Daniel D. Hutto (2008). Understanding Others Through Primary Interaction and Narrative Practice. In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha & E. Itkonen (eds.), The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. John Benjamins 17–38.
    We argue that theory-of-mind (ToM) approaches, such as “theory theory” and “simulation theory”, are both problematic and not needed. They account for neither our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others nor the true basis of our folk psychological understanding, even when narrowly construed. Developmental evidence shows that young infants are capable of grasping the purposeful intentions of others through the perception of bodily movements, gestures, facial expressions etc. Trevarthen’s notion of primary intersubjectivity can provide a theoretical framework for (...)
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  2.  286 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2003). Bodily Self-Awareness and Object Perception. Theoria Et Historia Scientarum 7 (1):53--68.
    Gallagher, S. 2003. Bodily self-awareness and object perception. _Theoria et Historia Scientiarum: International Journal for Interdisciplinary_ _Studies_, 7 (1) - in press.
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  3.  271 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2012). The Overextended Mind. Versus 113:57-68.
    Clark and Chalmers [1998] introduced the concept of the extended mind, in part to move beyond the standard Cartesian idea that cognition is something that happens in a private mental space, "in the head." In this paper I want to pursue a liberal interpretation of this idea, extending the mind to include processes that occur within social and cultural institutions. At the same time I want to address some concerns that have been raised about whether such..
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  4.  267 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher & Anthony J. Marcel (2002). The Self in Contextualized Action. In Jonathan Shear & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic 273.
    This paper suggests that certain traditional ways of analysing the self start off in situations that are abstract or detached from normal experience, and that the conclusions reached in such approaches are, as a result, inexact or mistaken. The paper raises the question of whether there are more contextualized forms of self- consciousness than those usually appealed to in philosophical or psychological analyses, and whether they can be the basis for a more adequate theoretical approach to the self. First, we (...)
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  5.  251 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2005). Metzinger's Matrix: Living the Virtual Life with a Real Body. Psyche 11 (5).
    Is it possible to say that there is no real self if we take a non-Cartesian view of the body? Is it possible to say that an organism can engage in pragmatic action and intersubjective interaction and that the self generated in such activity is not real? This depends on how we define the concept "real". By taking a close look at embodied action, and at Metzinger's concept of embodiment, I want to argue that, on a non-Cartesian concept of reality, (...)
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  6.  250 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2004). Hermeneutics and the Cognitive Sciences. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):162-174.
    Hermeneutics is usually defined as the theory and practice of interpretation. As a discipline it involves a long and complex history, starting with concerns about the proper interpretation of literary, sacred, and legal texts. In the twentieth century, hermeneutics broadens to include the idea that humans are, in Charles Taylor’s phrase, ‘self-interpreting animals’ (Taylor, 1985). In contrast to the narrowly prescriptive questions of textual interpretation, philosophical hermeneutics, as developed by thinkers like Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur, raises questions about the conditions (...)
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  7.  249 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2007). The Natural Philosophy of Agency. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):347–357.
    A review of several theories and brain-imaging experiments shows that there is no consensus about how to define the sense of agency. In some cases the sense of agency is construed in terms of bodily movement or motor control, in others it is linked to the intentional aspect of action. For some theorists it is the product of higher-order cognitive processes, for others it is a feature of first-order phenomenal experience. In this article I propose a multiple aspects account of (...)
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  8.  235 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2010). Multiple Aspects of Agency. New Ideas in Psychology.
    Recent significant research in a number of disciplines centers around the concept of the sense of agency. Because many of these studies cut across disciplinary lines there is good reason to seek a clear consensus on what ‘sense of agency’ means. In this paper I indicate some complexities that this consensus might have to deal with. I also highlight an important phenomenological distinction that needs to be considered in any discussion of the sense of agency, regardless of how it gets (...)
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  9.  235 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2001). The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simulation or Primary Interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):83-108.
    Theory of mind explanations of how we know other minds are limited in several ways. First, they construe intersubjective relations too narrowly in terms of the specialized cognitive abilities of explaining and predicting another person's mental states and behaviors. Second, they sometimes draw conclusions about secondperson interaction from experiments designed to test third-person observation of another's behavior. As a result, the larger claims that are sometimes made for theory of mind, namely, that theory of mind is our primary and pervasive (...)
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  10.  215 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2000). Philosophical Conceptions of the Self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.
    Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings. Second, there is (...)
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  11.  213 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2006). Logical and Phenomenological Arguments Against Simulation Theory. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers. Kluwer/Springer Press 63--78.
    Theory theorists conceive of social cognition as a theoretical and observational enterprise rather than a practical and interactive one. According to them, we do our best to explain other people's actions and mental experience by appealing to folk psychology as a kind of rule book that serves to guide our observations through our puzzling encounters with others. Seemingly, for them, most of our encounters count as puzzling, and other people are always in need of explanation. By contrast, simulation theorists do (...)
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  12.  210 DLs
    Anika Fiebich & Shaun Gallagher (2012). Joint Attention in Joint Action. Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87.
    In this paper, we investigate the role of intention and joint attention in joint actions. Depending on the shared intentions the agents have, we distinguish between joint path-goal actions and joint final-goal actions. We propose an instrumental account of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic action and argue that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action. Furthermore, we discuss the functional role of intentional joint attention for successful cooperation in complex joint actions. Anika Fiebich is PhD (...)
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  13.  188 DLs
    Jonathan Cole, Natalie Depraz & Shaun Gallagher, Unity and Disunity in Bodily Awareness: Phenomenology and Neuroscience. Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness Workshop.
  14.  184 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher, Perceiving Others in Action / la Perception d'Autrui En Action.
    In a New York Times article last month, entitled Cells that read minds, the neuroscience reporter, Sandra Blakeslee (January 10, 2006) provided a list of all the things that mirror neurons can explain. As we know, mirror neurons, discovered by Rizzolattis group in Parma, are neurons that are activated when we engage in action, and when we perceive intentional movement in another person. According to Blakeslee and the scientists she interviewed, mirror neurons explain not only how we are capable of (...)
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  15.  181 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2005). Review of Alva Noë's Action in Perception. [REVIEW] Times Literary Supplement.
    In Action in Perception, Alva Noë provides a persuasive account of the “enactive” approach to perception, according to which perception is not simply based on the processing of sensory information, or on the construction of internal representations, but is fundamentally shaped by the motor possibilities of the perceiving body. As John Dewey put it in 1896, in his essay, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology”.
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  16.  180 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2008). Are Minimal Representations Still Representations? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):351 – 369.
    I examine the following question: Do actions require representations that are intrinsic to the action itself? Recent work by Mark Rowlands, Michael Wheeler, and Andy Clark suggests that actions may require a minimal form of representation. I argue that the various concepts of minimal representation on offer do not apply to action per se and that a non-representationalist account that focuses on dynamic systems of self-organizing continuous reciprocal causation at the sub-personal level is superior. I further recommend a scientific pragmatism (...)
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  17.  180 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher & Francisco Varela, Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
  18.  180 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2006). Where's the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press 109-124.
    Some philosophers argue that Descartes was wrong when he characterized animals as purely physical automata – robots devoid of consciousness. It seems to them obvious that animals (tigers, lions, and bears, as well as chimps, dogs, and dolphins, and so forth) are conscious. There are other philosophers who argue that it is not beyond the realm of possibilities that robots and other artificial agents may someday be conscious – and it is certainly practical to take the intentional stance toward them (...)
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  19.  177 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2009). Philosophical Antecedents of Situated Cognition. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge 35--53.
  20.  173 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher, Neurophilosophy and Neurophenomenology. Phenomenology 2005.
    I consider two specific issues to show the difference between a neurophilosophical approach and a neurophenomenlogical approach, namely, the issues of self and intersubjectivity. Neurophilosophy (which starts with theory that is continuous with common sense) and neurophenomenology (which generates theory in methodically controlled practices) lead to very different philosophical views on these issues.
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  21.  170 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2005). Intentionality and Intentional Action. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):319-326.
    Those who argue that free will is an illusion are wrong. They base their argument on scientific evidence that tests the wrong level of description for intentional action. Free will is not about subpersonal neuronal processes, muscular activation, or basic bodily movements, but about contextualized actions in a system that is larger than many contemporary philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists consider. In this paper, I describe the kind of intentionality that goes with the exercise of free will.
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  22.  166 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (1986). Lived Body and Environment. Research in Phenomenology 16 (1):139-170.
    Merleau-Ponty developed a phenomenology of the body that promoted a non-dualistic account of human existence. In this paper I intend to develop Merleau-Ponty's analysis further by questioning his account of the body on the issues of body perception, and the body's relation to its environment. To clarify these issues I draw from both the phenomenological tradition and recent psychological investigations.
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  23.  163 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2007). Moral Agency, Self-Consciousness, and Practical Wisdom. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):199-223.
    This paper argues that self-consciousness and moral agency depend crucially on both embodied and social aspects of human existence, and that the capacity for practical wisdom, phronesis, is central to moral personhood. The nature of practical wisdom is elucidated by drawing on rival analyses of expertise. Although ethical expertise and practical wisdom differ importantly, they are alike in that we can acquire them only in interaction with other persons and through habituation. The analysis of moral agency and practical wisdom is (...)
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  24.  162 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2010). Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. [REVIEW] Topoi 29 (2):183-185.
    Issue Title: Logic, Meaning, and Truth-Making States of Affairs in Philosophical Semantics/Guest Edited by Dale Jacquette.
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  25.  148 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher & Jesper B. Sorensen (2006). Experimenting with Phenomenology. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):119-134.
    We review the use of introspective and phenomenological methods in experimental settings. We distinguish different senses of introspection, and further distinguish phenomenological method from introspectionist approaches. Two ways of using phenomenology in experimental procedures are identified: first, the neurophenomenological method, proposed by Varela, involves the training of experimental subjects. This approach has been directly and productively incorporated into the protocol of experiments on perception. A second approach may have wider application and does not involve training experimental subjects in phenomenological method. (...)
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  26.  146 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher & Andrew N. Meltzoff (1996). The Earliest Sense of Self and Others: Merleau-Ponty and Recent Developmental Studies. Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):211-33.
    Recent studies in developmental psychology have found evidence to suggest that there exists an innate system that accounts for the possibilities of early infant imitation and the existence of phantom limbs in cases of congenital absence of limbs. These results challenge traditional assumptions about the status and development of the body schema and body image, and about the nature of the translation process between perceptual experience and motor ability.
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  27.  138 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2004). Understanding Interpersonal Problems in Autism: Interaction Theory as an Alternative to Theory of Mind. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (3):199-217.
  28.  135 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2008). Intersubjectivity in Perception. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):163-178.
    The embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended approaches to cognition explicate many important details for a phenomenology of perception, and are consistent with some of the traditional phenomenological analyses. Theorists working in these areas, however, often fail to provide an account of how intersubjectivity might relate to perception. This paper suggests some ways in which intersubjectivity is important for an adequate account of perception.
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  29.  131 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi, Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects (...)
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  30.  129 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2004). Les Conditions de Corporéité Et d'Intersubjectivité Chez la Personne Morale. Theologiques 12 (1-2):135-64.
    Que signifie le fait d’avoir le statut de personne morale, c’est-à-dire d’avoir la capacité de responsabilité morale ? Dans un important essai sur la question, Dennett (1976) a proposé six conditions qui définissent ce concept. Premièrement, l’entité à laquelle nous attribuerions le statut de personne morale doit être douée de rationalité. Deuxièmement, elle doit être capable d’adopter la position intentionnelle — c’est-à-dire qu’elle doit être capable d’attribuer des intentions aux autres. Troisièmement, elle doit pouvoir être l’objet d’une certaine attitude (par (...)
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  31.  126 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford University Press.
    How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioral expressions (...)
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  32.  126 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (1997). Mutual Enlightenment: Recent Phenomenology in Cognitive Science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3):195-214.
    The term phenomenology can be used in a generic sense to cover a variety of areas related to the problem of consciousness. In this sense it is a title that ranges over issues pertaining to first-person or subjective experience, qualia, and what has become known as "the hard problem" (Chalmers 1995). The term is sometimes used even more generally to signify a variety of approaches to studying such issues, including contemplative, meditative, and mystical studies, and transpersonal psychology.(1) Within the disciplines (...)
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  33.  123 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2005). Fenomenologiczne I Eksperymentalne Badania Ucieleśnionego Doświadczenia. In Fenomenologia I Nauki Kognitywne. Wydawnictwo Rafal Marszalek
    W sytuacjach, gdy powinniśmy mieć do czynienia ze wzajemnym oświecaniem, w rzeczywistości często spotykamy się z obopólnym oporem między kognitywistyką a fenomenologią, gdzie ta druga rozumiana jest jako podejście metodologiczne, po raz pierwszy zarysowane przez Husserla. Filozofowie umysłu, z pierwszych szeregów kognitywistów, niejednokrotnie czynią lekceważące gesty w stosunku do fenomenologii, oparte na myleniu fenomenologii z niewykwalifikoną introspekcją psychologiczną (np. Dennett, 1991). Z kolei wielu fenomenologów podlega mylnemu wrażeniu, że kognitywistyce nie udało się wyjść poza tradycyjne modele komputacyjne (DSSI – „dobra (...)
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  34.  122 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher & Anthony Crisafi (2009). Mental Institutions. Topoi 28 (1):45-51.
    We propose to extend Clark and Chalmer’s concept of the extended mind to consider the possibility that social institutions (e.g., legal systems, museums) may operate in ways similar to the hand-held conveniences (notebooks, calculators) that are often used as examples of extended mind. The inspiration for this suggestion can be found in the writings of Hegel on “objective spirit” which involves the mind in a constant process of externalizing and internalizing. For Hegel, social institutions are pieces of the mind, externalized (...)
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  35.  122 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Cole (1995). Body Image and Body Schema in a Deafferented Subject. Journal of Mind and Behavior 16 (4):369-390.
    In a majority of situations the normal adult maintains posture or moves without consciously monitoring motor activity. Posture and movement are usually close to automatic; they tend to take care of themselves, outside of attentive regard. One's body, in such cases, effaces itself as one is geared into a particular intentional goal. This effacement is possible because of the normal functioning of a body schema. Body schema can be defined as a system of preconscious, subpersonal processes that play a dynamic (...)
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  36.  121 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2003). Sync-Ing in the Stream of Experience: Time-Consciousness in Broad, Husserl, and Dainton. Psyche 9 (10).
    By examining Dainton's account of the temporality of consciousness in the context of long-running debates about the specious present and time consciousness in both the Jamesian and the phenomenological traditions, I raise critical objections to his overlap model. Dainton's interpretations of Broad and Husserl are both insightful and problematic. In addition, there are unresolved problems in Dainton's own analysis of conscious experience. These problems involve ongoing content, lingering content, and a lack of phenomenological clarity concerning the central concept of overlapping (...)
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  37.  120 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher & Matthew Bower (2014). Making Enactivism Even More Embodied. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):232-247.
    The full scope of enactivist approaches to cognition includes not only a focus on sensory-motor contingencies and physical affordances for action, but also an emphasis on affective factors of embodiment and intersubjective affordances for social interaction. This strong conception of embodied cognition calls for a new way to think about the role of the brain in the larger system of brain-body-environment. We ask whether recent work on predictive coding offers a way to think about brain function in an enactive system, (...)
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  38.  114 DLs
    Michael S. Gazzaniga & Shaun Gallagher (1998). The Neuronal Platonist. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):706-717.
    Psychology is dead. The self is a fiction invented by the brain. Brain plasticity isn?t all it?s cracked up to be. Our conscious learning is an observation post factum, a recollection of something already accomplished by the brain. We don?t learn to speak; speech is generated when the brain is ready to say something. False memories are more prevalent than one might think, and they aren?t all that bad. We think we?re in charge of our lives, but actually we are (...)
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  39.  95 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2007). Simulation Trouble. Social Neuroscience 2 (3-4):353–365.
    I present arguments against both explicit and implicit versions of the simulation theory for intersubjective understanding. Logical, developmental, and phenomenological evidence counts against the concept of explicit simulation if this is to be understood as the pervasive or default way that we understand others. The concept of implicit (subpersonal) simulation, identified with neural resonance systems (mirror systems or shared representations), fails to be the kind of simulation required by simulation theory, because it fails to explain how neuronal processes meet constraints (...)
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  40.  92 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2008). Inference or Interaction: Social Cognition Without Precursors. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):163 – 174.
    In this paper I defend interaction theory (IT) as an alternative to both theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). IT opposes the basic suppositions that both TT and ST depend upon. I argue that the various capacities for primary and secondary intersubjectivity found in infancy and early childhood should not be thought of as precursors to later developing capacities for using folk psychology or simulation routines. They are not replaced or displaced by such capacities in adulthood, but rather continue (...)
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  41.  85 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (ed.) (2011). The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
    The Oxford Handbook of the Self is an interdisciplinary collection of essays that address questions in all of these areas.
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  42.  85 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2012). In Defense of Phenomenological Approaches to Social Cognition: Interacting with the Critics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):187-212.
    I clarify recently developed phenomenological approaches to social cognition. These are approaches that, drawing on developmental science, social neuroscience, and dynamic systems theory, emphasize the involvement of embodied and enactive processes together with communicative and narrative practices in contexts of intersubjective understanding. I review some of the evidence that supports these approaches. I consider a variety of criticisms leveled against them, and defend the role of phenomenology in the explanation of social cognition. Finally, I show how these phenomenological approaches can (...)
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  43.  83 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (1979). Suggestions Towards a Revision of Husserl's Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness. Man and World 12 (4):445-464.
    In this paper I offer four distinct but related suggestions: (1) That Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness is an adequate account of the concept of the specious present; (2) That the Querschtfftt o5 momentary phase of consdousness is genuinely only a Querschnittanskht; (3) That retention, primal-impression, and protention are functions of consciousness rather than phases or types o.f coasdousness; (4) That further conceptual clarification and terminological reformulation is needed.
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  44.  83 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2005). Phenomenological Contributions to a Theory of Social Cognition. Husserl Studies 21 (2):95-110.
    Hidden away in the remote corners of one of the largest parts of Husserl's Kˆrper, if we can use that word to translate Corpus, there is ein Leib , an animate body of text that reverberates not only with some of Husserl's other little known texts, but also with some of the most recent discoveries in neuroscience. These texts suggest a theory of intersubjectivity, or what psychologists term social cognition. Let me start with a proviso: whether Husserl ever fully settled (...)
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  45.  81 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher, Phenomenological and Experimental Research on Embodied Experience. Atelier Phenomenologie Et Cognition: Theorie de la Cognition Et Necessité d'Une Investigation Phenomenologique.
    In recent years there has been some hard-won but still limited agreement that phenomenology may be of central importance to the cognitive sciences. This realization comes in the wake of dismissive gestures made by philosophers of mind like Dennett (1991), who mistakenly associates phenomenological method with the worst forms of introspection. For very different reasons, resistance can also be found on the phenomenological side of this issue. There are many thinkers well versed in the Husserlian tradition who do not even (...)
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  46.  78 DLs
    Jonathan Cole, Shaun Gallagher & David McNeill (2002). Gesture Following Deafferentation: A Phenomenologically Informed Experimental Study. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):49-67.
    Empirical studies of gesture in a subject who has lost proprioception and the sense of touch from the neck down show that specific aspects of gesture remain normal despite abnormal motor processes for instrumental movement. The experiments suggest that gesture, as a linguistic phenomenon, is not reducible to instrumental movement. They also support and extend claims made by Merleau-Ponty concerning the relationship between language and cognition. Gesture, as language, contributes to the accomplishment of thought.
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  47.  76 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (1986). Hyletic Experience and the Lived Body. Husserl Studies 3 (2):131-166.
    The theory of hyletic data has been criticized and dismissed a number of times since Edmund Husserl proposed it early in this century. This rejection of Husserl's theory has been part of a larger, wholesale critique of the traditional notion of sensation in which theories of sensation have been displaced by theories of perception.
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  48.  74 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (2003). Self-Narrative, Embodied Action, and Social Context. In A. Wiercinski (ed.), Between Suspicion and Sympathy: Paul Ricoeur's Unstable Equilibrium (Festschrift for Paul Ricoeur). The Hermeneutic Press
    In recent philosophy of mind, informed by ongoing research in the cognitive neurosciences, there has been a tendency to offer deflationary or reductive explanations of self and selfidentity. The background to such accounts includes a complex history of the problem of personal identity from Hume to Parfit. Paul Ricoeur has provided an insightful perspective on this history based on his distinction between ipse identity and idem identity.1 My intention is not to rehearse that history, or even to update it, but (...)
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  49.  74 DLs
    Shaun Gallagher (1986). Body Image and Body Schema: A Conceptual Clarification. Journal of Mind and Behaviour 7 (4):541-554.
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