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Shaun Gallagher [181]Shaun Andrew Gallagher [1]
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Profile: Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis, University of Wollongong)
  1. Shaun Gallagher (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioral expressions (...)
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  2. Shaun Gallagher (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford University Press.
    How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioral expressions (...)
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  3.  16
    Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi (2012). The Phenomenological Mind. Routledge.
    This volume introduces fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology.
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  4. Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi (2007). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Routledge.
    The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: What is phenomenology? naturalizing phenomenology and the empirical cognitive sciences phenomenology and consciousness consciousness and self-consciousness, including perception and action time and consciousness, including William James intentionality the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds phenomenology and personal identity Interesting and important examples are used throughout, including phantom limb syndrome, blindsight (...)
     
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  5. Shaun Gallagher (2000). Philosophical Conceptions of the Self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.
    Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings. Second, there is (...)
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  6.  83
    Hanne de Jaegher, Ezequiel di Paolo & Shaun Gallagher (2010). Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10):441-447.
    An important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward embodied and participatory aspects of social understanding. Empirical results already imply that social cognition is not reducible to the workings of individual cognitive mechanisms. To galvanize this interactive turn, we provide an operational definition of social interaction and distinguish the different explanatory roles – contextual, enabling and constitutive – it can play in social cognition. We show that interactive processes are (...)
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  7. Shaun Gallagher & Daniel D. Hutto (2008). Understanding Others Through Primary Interaction and Narrative Practice. In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha & E. Itkonen (eds.), The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. John Benjamins 17–38.
    We argue that theory-of-mind (ToM) approaches, such as “theory theory” and “simulation theory”, are both problematic and not needed. They account for neither our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others nor the true basis of our folk psychological understanding, even when narrowly construed. Developmental evidence shows that young infants are capable of grasping the purposeful intentions of others through the perception of bodily movements, gestures, facial expressions etc. Trevarthen’s notion of primary intersubjectivity can provide a theoretical framework for (...)
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  8. Shaun Gallagher (2001). The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simulation or Primary Interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):83-108.
    Theory of mind explanations of how we know other minds are limited in several ways. First, they construe intersubjective relations too narrowly in terms of the specialized cognitive abilities of explaining and predicting another person's mental states and behaviors. Second, they sometimes draw conclusions about secondperson interaction from experiments designed to test third-person observation of another's behavior. As a result, the larger claims that are sometimes made for theory of mind, namely, that theory of mind is our primary and pervasive (...)
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  9. Shaun Gallagher (2012). Phenomenology. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This new introduction by Shaun Gallagher gives students and philosophers not only an excellent concise overview of the state of the field and contemporary debates, but a novel way of addressing the subject by looking at the ways in which phenomenology is useful to the disciplines it applies to. Gallagher retrieves the central insights made by the classic phenomenological philosophers (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and others), updates some of these insights in innovative ways, and shows how they directly relate to (...)
     
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  10. Shaun Gallagher (2008). Inference or Interaction: Social Cognition Without Precursors. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):163 – 174.
    In this paper I defend interaction theory (IT) as an alternative to both theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). IT opposes the basic suppositions that both TT and ST depend upon. I argue that the various capacities for primary and secondary intersubjectivity found in infancy and early childhood should not be thought of as precursors to later developing capacities for using folk psychology or simulation routines. They are not replaced or displaced by such capacities in adulthood, but rather continue (...)
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  11.  47
    Shaun Gallagher & Somogy Varga (2014). Social Constraints on the Direct Perception of Emotions and Intentions. Topoi 33 (1):185-199.
    In this paper, we first review recent arguments about the direct perception of the intentions and emotions of others, emphasizing the role of embodied interaction. We then consider a possible objection to the direct perception hypothesis from social psychology, related to phenomena like ‘dehumanization’ and ‘implicit racial bias’, which manifest themselves on a basic bodily level. On the background of such data, one might object that social perception cannot be direct since it depends on and can in (...)
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  12. Shaun Gallagher (2004). Understanding Interpersonal Problems in Autism: Interaction Theory as an Alternative to Theory of Mind. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (3):199-217.
  13. Shaun Gallagher (2007). Simulation Trouble. Social Neuroscience 2 (3-4):353–365.
    I present arguments against both explicit and implicit versions of the simulation theory for intersubjective understanding. Logical, developmental, and phenomenological evidence counts against the concept of explicit simulation if this is to be understood as the pervasive or default way that we understand others. The concept of implicit (subpersonal) simulation, identified with neural resonance systems (mirror systems or shared representations), fails to be the kind of simulation required by simulation theory, because it fails to explain how neuronal processes meet constraints (...)
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  14. Shaun Gallagher (2012). In Defense of Phenomenological Approaches to Social Cognition: Interacting with the Critics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):187-212.
    I clarify recently developed phenomenological approaches to social cognition. These are approaches that, drawing on developmental science, social neuroscience, and dynamic systems theory, emphasize the involvement of embodied and enactive processes together with communicative and narrative practices in contexts of intersubjective understanding. I review some of the evidence that supports these approaches. I consider a variety of criticisms leveled against them, and defend the role of phenomenology in the explanation of social cognition. Finally, I show how these phenomenological approaches can (...)
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  15. Shaun Gallagher (2007). The Natural Philosophy of Agency. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):347–357.
    A review of several theories and brain-imaging experiments shows that there is no consensus about how to define the sense of agency. In some cases the sense of agency is construed in terms of bodily movement or motor control, in others it is linked to the intentional aspect of action. For some theorists it is the product of higher-order cognitive processes, for others it is a feature of first-order phenomenal experience. In this article I propose a multiple aspects account of (...)
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  16.  81
    Shaun Gallagher (2004). Neurocognitive Models of Schizophrenia: A Neurophenomenological Critique. Psychopathology 37 (1):8–19.
    In the past dozen years a number of theoretical models of schizophrenic symptoms have been proposed, often inspired by advances in the cognitive sciences, and especially cognitive neuroscience. Perhaps the most widely cited and influential of these is the neurocognitive model proposed by Christopher Frith (1992). Frith's influence reaches into psychiatry, neuroscience, and even philosophy. The philosopher John Campbell (1999a), for example, has called Frith's model the most parsimonious explanation of how self-ascriptions of thoughts are subject to errors of identification. (...)
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  17. Shaun Gallagher & Matthew Bower (2014). Making Enactivism Even More Embodied. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):232-247.
    The full scope of enactivist approaches to cognition includes not only a focus on sensory-motor contingencies and physical affordances for action, but also an emphasis on affective factors of embodiment and intersubjective affordances for social interaction. This strong conception of embodied cognition calls for a new way to think about the role of the brain in the larger system of brain-body-environment. We ask whether recent work on predictive coding offers a way to think about brain function in an enactive system, (...)
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  18.  58
    Shaun Gallagher & Daniel J. Povinelli (2012). Enactive and Behavioral Abstraction Accounts of Social Understanding in Chimpanzees, Infants, and Adults. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):145-169.
    We argue against theory-of-mind interpretation of recent false-belief experiments with young infants and explore two other interpretations: enactive and behavioral abstraction approaches. We then discuss the differences between these alternatives.
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  19.  35
    Shaun Gallagher (2012). Empathy, Simulation, and Narrative. Science in Context 25 (3):355-381.
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  20. Shaun Gallagher (2008). Are Minimal Representations Still Representations? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):351 – 369.
    I examine the following question: Do actions require representations that are intrinsic to the action itself? Recent work by Mark Rowlands, Michael Wheeler, and Andy Clark suggests that actions may require a minimal form of representation. I argue that the various concepts of minimal representation on offer do not apply to action per se and that a non-representationalist account that focuses on dynamic systems of self-organizing continuous reciprocal causation at the sub-personal level is superior. I further recommend a scientific pragmatism (...)
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  21. Shaun Gallagher & Anthony J. Marcel (2002). The Self in Contextualized Action. In Jonathan Shear & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic 273.
    This paper suggests that certain traditional ways of analysing the self start off in situations that are abstract or detached from normal experience, and that the conclusions reached in such approaches are, as a result, inexact or mistaken. The paper raises the question of whether there are more contextualized forms of self- consciousness than those usually appealed to in philosophical or psychological analyses, and whether they can be the basis for a more adequate theoretical approach to the self. First, we (...)
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  22. Shaun Gallagher (2003). Bodily Self-Awareness and Object Perception. Theoria Et Historia Scientarum 7 (1):53--68.
    Gallagher, S. 2003. Bodily self-awareness and object perception. _Theoria et Historia Scientiarum: International Journal for Interdisciplinary_ _Studies_, 7 (1) - in press.
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  23. Shaun Gallagher & Jesper B. Sorensen (2006). Experimenting with Phenomenology. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):119-134.
    We review the use of introspective and phenomenological methods in experimental settings. We distinguish different senses of introspection, and further distinguish phenomenological method from introspectionist approaches. Two ways of using phenomenology in experimental procedures are identified: first, the neurophenomenological method, proposed by Varela, involves the training of experimental subjects. This approach has been directly and productively incorporated into the protocol of experiments on perception. A second approach may have wider application and does not involve training experimental subjects in phenomenological method. (...)
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  24. Shaun Gallagher (2004). Understanding Interpersonal Problems in Autism. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (3):199-217.
    A BSTRACT: I argue that theory theory approaches to autism offer a wholly inadequate explanation of autistic symptoms because they offer a wholly inadequate account of the non-autistic understanding of others. As an alternative I outline interaction theory, which incorporates evidence from both developmental and phenomenological studies to show that humans are endowed with important capacities for intersubjective understanding from birth or early infancy. As part of a neurophenomenological analysis of autism, interaction theory offers an account of interpersonal problems that (...)
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  25. Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi, Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects (...)
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  26. Shaun Gallagher & Francisco Varela, Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
  27.  59
    Shaun Gallagher (2000). Self-Reference and Schizophrenia: A Cognitive Model of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins 203--239.
  28.  18
    Shaun Gallagher (2009). Two Problems of Intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6-8.
    I propose a distinction between two closely related problems: the problem of social cognition and the problem of participatory sense-making. One problem focuses on how we understand others; the other problem focuses on how, with others, we make sense out of the world. Both understanding others and making sense out of the world involve social interaction. The importance of participatory sense-making is highlighted by reviewing some recent accounts of perception that are philosophically autistic -- i.e., accounts that ignore the involvement (...)
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  29. Shaun Gallagher (2007). Moral Agency, Self-Consciousness, and Practical Wisdom. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):199-223.
    This paper argues that self-consciousness and moral agency depend crucially on both embodied and social aspects of human existence, and that the capacity for practical wisdom, phronesis, is central to moral personhood. The nature of practical wisdom is elucidated by drawing on rival analyses of expertise. Although ethical expertise and practical wisdom differ importantly, they are alike in that we can acquire them only in interaction with other persons and through habituation. The analysis of moral agency and practical wisdom is (...)
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  30. Shaun Gallagher (2010). Multiple Aspects of Agency. New Ideas in Psychology.
    Recent significant research in a number of disciplines centers around the concept of the sense of agency. Because many of these studies cut across disciplinary lines there is good reason to seek a clear consensus on what ‘sense of agency’ means. In this paper I indicate some complexities that this consensus might have to deal with. I also highlight an important phenomenological distinction that needs to be considered in any discussion of the sense of agency, regardless of how it gets (...)
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  31. Shaun Gallagher (2012). The Overextended Mind. Versus 113:57-68.
    Clark and Chalmers [1998] introduced the concept of the extended mind, in part to move beyond the standard Cartesian idea that cognition is something that happens in a private mental space, "in the head." In this paper I want to pursue a liberal interpretation of this idea, extending the mind to include processes that occur within social and cultural institutions. At the same time I want to address some concerns that have been raised about whether such..
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  32. Shaun Gallagher (2005). Metzinger's Matrix: Living the Virtual Life with a Real Body. Psyche 11 (5).
    Is it possible to say that there is no real self if we take a non-Cartesian view of the body? Is it possible to say that an organism can engage in pragmatic action and intersubjective interaction and that the self generated in such activity is not real? This depends on how we define the concept "real". By taking a close look at embodied action, and at Metzinger's concept of embodiment, I want to argue that, on a non-Cartesian concept of reality, (...)
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  33.  26
    Shaun Gallagher (2003). Phenomenology and Experimental Design: Toward a Phenomenologically Enlightened Experimental Science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):85-99.
    I review three answers to the question: How can phenomenology contribute to the experimental cognitive neurosciences? The first approach, neurophenomenology, employs phenomenological method and training, and uses first-person reports not just as more data for analysis, but to generate descriptive categories that are intersubjectively and scientifically validated, and are then used to interpret results that correlate with objective measurements of behaviour and brain activity. A second approach, indirect phenomenology, is shown to be problematic in a number of ways. Indirect phenomenology (...)
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  34.  4
    Shaun Gallagher & Yochai Ataria (2015). Somatic Apathy. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (1):105-122.
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  35. Shaun Gallagher & Anthony Crisafi (2009). Mental Institutions. Topoi 28 (1):45-51.
    We propose to extend Clark and Chalmer’s concept of the extended mind to consider the possibility that social institutions (e.g., legal systems, museums) may operate in ways similar to the hand-held conveniences (notebooks, calculators) that are often used as examples of extended mind. The inspiration for this suggestion can be found in the writings of Hegel on “objective spirit” which involves the mind in a constant process of externalizing and internalizing. For Hegel, social institutions are pieces of the mind, externalized (...)
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  36. Shaun Gallagher (2004). Hermeneutics and the Cognitive Sciences. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):162-174.
    Hermeneutics is usually defined as the theory and practice of interpretation. As a discipline it involves a long and complex history, starting with concerns about the proper interpretation of literary, sacred, and legal texts. In the twentieth century, hermeneutics broadens to include the idea that humans are, in Charles Taylor’s phrase, ‘self-interpreting animals’ (Taylor, 1985). In contrast to the narrowly prescriptive questions of textual interpretation, philosophical hermeneutics, as developed by thinkers like Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur, raises questions about the conditions (...)
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  37. Shaun Gallagher (2006). Where's the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press 109-124.
    Some philosophers argue that Descartes was wrong when he characterized animals as purely physical automata – robots devoid of consciousness. It seems to them obvious that animals (tigers, lions, and bears, as well as chimps, dogs, and dolphins, and so forth) are conscious. There are other philosophers who argue that it is not beyond the realm of possibilities that robots and other artificial agents may someday be conscious – and it is certainly practical to take the intentional stance toward them (...)
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  38. Shaun Gallagher & Andrew N. Meltzoff (1996). The Earliest Sense of Self and Others: Merleau-Ponty and Recent Developmental Studies. Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):211-33.
    Recent studies in developmental psychology have found evidence to suggest that there exists an innate system that accounts for the possibilities of early infant imitation and the existence of phantom limbs in cases of congenital absence of limbs. These results challenge traditional assumptions about the status and development of the body schema and body image, and about the nature of the translation process between perceptual experience and motor ability.
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  39. Shaun Gallagher (2009). Philosophical Antecedents of Situated Cognition. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge 35--53.
  40. Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Cole (1995). Body Image and Body Schema in a Deafferented Subject. Journal of Mind and Behavior 16 (4):369-390.
    In a majority of situations the normal adult maintains posture or moves without consciously monitoring motor activity. Posture and movement are usually close to automatic; they tend to take care of themselves, outside of attentive regard. One's body, in such cases, effaces itself as one is geared into a particular intentional goal. This effacement is possible because of the normal functioning of a body schema. Body schema can be defined as a system of preconscious, subpersonal processes that play a dynamic (...)
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  41. Shaun Gallagher (2006). Logical and Phenomenological Arguments Against Simulation Theory. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers. Kluwer/Springer Press 63--78.
    Theory theorists conceive of social cognition as a theoretical and observational enterprise rather than a practical and interactive one. According to them, we do our best to explain other people's actions and mental experience by appealing to folk psychology as a kind of rule book that serves to guide our observations through our puzzling encounters with others. Seemingly, for them, most of our encounters count as puzzling, and other people are always in need of explanation. By contrast, simulation theorists do (...)
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  42. Shaun Gallagher, Neurophilosophy and Neurophenomenology. Phenomenology 2005.
    I consider two specific issues to show the difference between a neurophilosophical approach and a neurophenomenlogical approach, namely, the issues of self and intersubjectivity. Neurophilosophy (which starts with theory that is continuous with common sense) and neurophenomenology (which generates theory in methodically controlled practices) lead to very different philosophical views on these issues.
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  43.  39
    Shaun Gallagher (1995). Body Schema and Intentionality. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press 225--244.
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  44. Shaun Gallagher (1997). Mutual Enlightenment: Recent Phenomenology in Cognitive Science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3):195-214.
    The term phenomenology can be used in a generic sense to cover a variety of areas related to the problem of consciousness. In this sense it is a title that ranges over issues pertaining to first-person or subjective experience, qualia, and what has become known as "the hard problem" (Chalmers 1995). The term is sometimes used even more generally to signify a variety of approaches to studying such issues, including contemplative, meditative, and mystical studies, and transpersonal psychology.(1) Within the disciplines (...)
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  45.  12
    Shaun Gallagher & Jesper Brøsted Sørensen (2006). Experimenting with Phenomenology. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):119-134.
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  46. Shaun Gallagher (2003). Sync-Ing in the Stream of Experience: Time-Consciousness in Broad, Husserl, and Dainton. Psyche 9 (10).
    By examining Dainton's account of the temporality of consciousness in the context of long-running debates about the specious present and time consciousness in both the Jamesian and the phenomenological traditions, I raise critical objections to his overlap model. Dainton's interpretations of Broad and Husserl are both insightful and problematic. In addition, there are unresolved problems in Dainton's own analysis of conscious experience. These problems involve ongoing content, lingering content, and a lack of phenomenological clarity concerning the central concept of overlapping (...)
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  47.  30
    Shaun Gallagher, Daniel D. Hutto, Jan Slaby & Jonathan Cole (2013). The Brain as Part of an Enactive System. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):421-422.
    The notion of an enactive system requires thinking about the brain in a way that is different from the standard computational-representational models. In evolutionary terms, the brain does what it does and is the way that it is, across some scale of variations, because it is part of a living body with hands that can reach and grasp in certain limited ways, eyes structured to focus, an autonomic system, an upright posture, etc. coping with specific kinds of environments, and with (...)
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  48. Shaun Gallagher (2004). Les Conditions de Corporéité Et d'Intersubjectivité Chez la Personne Morale. Theologiques 12 (1-2):135-64.
    Que signifie le fait d’avoir le statut de personne morale, c’est-à-dire d’avoir la capacité de responsabilité morale? Dans un important essai sur la question, Dennett a proposé six conditions qui définissent ce concept. Premièrement, l’entité à laquelle nous attribuerions le statut de personne morale doit être douée de rationalité. Deuxièmement, elle doit être capable d’adopter la position intentionnelle — c’est-à-dire qu’elle doit être capable d’attribuer des intentions aux autres. Troisièmement, elle doit pouvoir être l’objet d’une certaine attitude. Quatrièmement, elle doit (...)
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  49. Shaun Gallagher, Perceiving Others in Action / la Perception d'Autrui En Action.
    In a New York Times article last month, entitled Cells that read minds, the neuroscience reporter, Sandra Blakeslee (January 10, 2006) provided a list of all the things that mirror neurons can explain. As we know, mirror neurons, discovered by Rizzolattis group in Parma, are neurons that are activated when we engage in action, and when we perceive intentional movement in another person. According to Blakeslee and the scientists she interviewed, mirror neurons explain not only how we are capable of (...)
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  50.  32
    Tom Froese & Shaun Gallagher (2012). Getting Interaction Theory (IT) Together: Integrating Developmental, Phenomenological, Enactive, and Dynamical Approaches to Social Interaction. Interaction Studies 13 (3):436-468.
    We argue that progress in our scientific understanding of the `social mind' is hampered by a number of unfounded assumptions. We single out the widely shared assumption that social behavior depends solely on the capacities of an individual agent. In contrast, both developmental and phenomenological studies suggest that the personal-level capacity for detached `social cognition' (conceived as a process of theorizing about and/or simulating another mind) is a secondary achievement that is dependent on more immediate processes of embodied social interaction. (...)
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