El principio de no-contradicción en la argumentación escéptica: implicaciones y consecuencias

Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 29 (1):13-25 (2012)
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Abstract

The use, by the pyrronian scepticism, of an argumentative pattern based on the notion of contradicition leads us to think that said notion plays an important role among the basic starting points of its philosophy. Therefore, it appears as essential to start a detailed analysis of the implications of this notion inside the classic sceptical argument, in order to determinate the presence of implications derived from the principle of non-contradiction, and their compatibility with the philosophical position that corresponds to this hellenistic school

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