Computational modeling vs. computational explanation: Is everything a Turing machine, and does it matter to the philosophy of mind?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):93 – 115 (2007)
Abstract
According to pancomputationalism, everything is a computing system. In this paper, I distinguish between different varieties of pancomputationalism. I find that although some varieties are more plausible than others, only the strongest variety is relevant to the philosophy of mind, but only the most trivial varieties are true. As a side effect of this exercise, I offer a clarified distinction between computational modelling and computational explanation.<br><br>.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400601176494
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Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). Computing Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 74 (4):501-526.

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