Régis e Malebranche: un rapporto complesso

Abstract

Régis and Malebranche: A Complex Relationship. Pierre-Sylvain Régis was regarded by his contemporaries as the main representative of Cartesianism in France. His opposition to the other heir to the philosophy of Descartes, Nicolas Malebranche, is well known. However, the controversy on the theory that pleasure makes us happy in the present co-exists with Régis’ use of the Malebranchian doctrine of natural inclinations. Neither does his rejection of the Oratorian’s hedonism follow in any way from a deeper spiritualism, but from the complex reuse of issues deriving from Malebranche, Nicole and Descartes at the same time.

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