Abstract

This chapter considers the difficulties inherent in judgment, and focuses on differences of an ethical variety, shot through with the normative reality of the ethical pluralism of values, from relativisms to monisms, and some of their characteristics conditionality, incompatibility, and incommensurability. It also considers the type of commitments made in relation to these values and different types of conflict. The chapter explains five types of burdens of judgment listed by John Rawls. Rawls' solution for avoiding the general fact of State oppression has collateral effects on moral philosophy and on ethics. Unlike pluralism, relativism questions, in a variety of ways, the possibility of discussion, of justification and of a critique of values. There are at least three distinct types of relativism: radical relativism, conventionalist relativism, and perspectivist relativism. The most notable fact is reasonable pluralism, described as “the diversity of religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern democratic societies”.