Interest‐Relative Invariantism

In Knowledge and practical interests. New York: Oxford University Press (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter explains and develops a version of Interest-Relative Invariantism about knowledge, according to which whether or not someone knows that p at a certain time depends in part on what is at stake for them in being right about p at that time.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,497

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-25

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jason Stanley
Yale University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references