David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34 (2010)
Critics of the ideal of value‐free science often assume that they must reject the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values. I argue that this assumption is mistaken and that the distinction can be used to clarify and defend the argument from inductive risk, which challenges the value‐free ideal. I develop the idea that the characteristic feature of epistemic values is that they promote, either intrinsically or extrinsically, the attainment of truths. This proposal is shown to answer common objections to the distinction and provide a principled basis for separating legitimate from illegitimate influences of nonepistemic values in scientific inference. *Received June 2009; revised September 2009. †To contact the author, please write to: 503 S. Kedzie Hall, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824‐1032; e‐mail: firstname.lastname@example.org.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Kevin Elliott & Daniel McKaughan (2014). Nonepistemic Values and the Multiple Goals of Science. Philosophy of Science 81 (1):1-21.
Dan Hicks (2014). A New Direction for Science and Values. Synthese 191 (14):3271-95.
David Ludwig (2015). Ontological Choices and the Value-Free Ideal. Erkenntnis:1-20.
Heather Douglas (2014). The Value of Cognitive Values. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):796-806.
Kevin C. Elliott (2013). Douglas on Values: From Indirect Roles to Multiple Goals. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):375-383.
Similar books and articles
Daniel Steel & S. Kedzie Hall (2011). What If the Principle of Induction Is Normative? Formal Learning Theory and Hume's Problem. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):171-185.
Andrea Scarantino (2010). Inductive Risk and Justice in Kidney Allocation. Bioethics 24 (8):421-430.
Louis E. Loeb (2006). Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume's Argument About Induction. Synthese 152 (3):321 - 338.
Kevin C. Elliott (2011). Direct and Indirect Roles for Values in Science. Philosophy of Science 78 (2):303-324.
Wayne C. Myrvold (2012). Epistemic Values and the Value of Learning. Synthese 187 (2):547-568.
Phyllis Rooney (1992). On Values in Science: Is the Epistemic/Non-Epistemic Distinction Useful? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:13-22.
William A. Rottschaefer (2003). Assessing the Role of Non-Epistemic Feminist Values in Scientific Inquiry. Behavior and Philosophy 31:225 - 249.
Sven Diekmann & Martin Peterson (2013). The Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Engineering Models. Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (1):207-218.
Heather Douglas (2000). Inductive Risk and Values in Science. Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
Added to index2010-02-27
Total downloads100 ( #40,341 of 1,906,980 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #49,379 of 1,906,980 )
How can I increase my downloads?