Default Inheritance in Modified Statements: Bias or Inference?

Frontiers in Psychology 12 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is a fact that human subjects rate sentences about typical properties such as “Ravens are black” as very likely to be true. In comparison, modified sentences such as “Feathered ravens are black” receive lower ratings, especially if the modifier is atypical for the noun, as in “Jungle ravens are black”. This is called the modifier effect. However, the likelihood of the unmodified statement influences the perceived likelihood of the modified statement: the higher the rated likelihood of the unmodified sentence, the higher the rated likelihood of the modified one. That means the modifier effect does not fully block default inheritance of typical properties from nouns to modified nouns. This paper discusses this inheritance effect. In particular, I ask whether it is the direct result of composing concepts from nouns, that is, a bias toward “black” when processing “raven”. I report a series of experiments in which I find no evidence for a direct inheritance from composition. This supports the view that default inheritance is rather an inference than a bias.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,628

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Regarding the Raven Paradox.Robert J. Levy - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:17 - 23.
Spanish inflectional morphology in DATR.Antonio Moreno-Sandoval & José Miguel Goñi-Menoyo - 2002 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11 (1):79-105.
Popper on Scientific Statements.D. C. Stove - 1978 - Philosophy 53 (203):81 - 88.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-05-01

Downloads
6 (#1,455,459)

6 months
4 (#775,606)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Corina Strößner
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Relevance.D. Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 1986 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 2.
Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophy 65 (251):111-113.
A logic for default reasoning.Ray Reiter - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):81-137.
Defaults in update semantics.Frank Veltman - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):221 - 261.

View all 19 references / Add more references