David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Peter van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Van Inwagen, P.; Zimmerman, D. Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell. 365-373 (1998)
_This is an account of his present thinking by an excellent philosopher who has been_ _among the two or three foremost defenders of the doctrine that determinism and_ _freedom are incompatible -- that logically we cannot have both. In his 1983 book,_ _An Essay on Free Will_ _, he laid out with unique clarity and force a fundamental_ _argument for this conclusion. What the argument comes to is that if determinism is_ _true, we are not free, since our actions are effects of causal circumstances in the_ _remote past, and those circumstances are certainly not up to us. To that line of_ _thought, in the article below, by way of the supposition of a world of angels, he adds_ _something new. This is a fundamental difficulty with the freedom that we cannot_ _have if determinism is true. The difficulty, indeed a mystery, is one having to do with_ _the opposite of determinism -- indeterminism._
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Joseph Keim Campbell (2008). New Essays on the Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):193 - 201.
Similar books and articles
Laura W. Ekstrom (2003). Free Will, Chance, and Mystery. Philosophical Studies 22 (2):153-80.
Peter van Inwagen (2008). The Consequence Argument. In Peter Van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell Pub..
Tamler Sommers (2007). The Illusion of Freedom Evolves. In Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual volition and social context. MIT Press. 61.
J. David Velleman (1989). Epistemic Freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1):73-97.
Eugene Mills (2006). The Sweet Mystery of Compatibilism. Acta Analytica 21 (4):50 - 61.
J. David Velleman (1989). Epistemic Freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (March):73-97.
Peter van Inwagen (1975). The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies 27 (March):185-99.
Peter van Inwagen (2000). Free Will Remains a Mystery. Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads171 ( #5,244 of 1,410,137 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #38,371 of 1,410,137 )
How can I increase my downloads?