Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S213- (2001)
|Abstract||Recent discussion of the statistical character of evolutionary theory has centered around two positions: (1) Determinism combined with the claim that the statistical character is eliminable, a subjective interpretation of probability, and instrumentalism; (2) Indeterminism combined with the claim that the statistical character is ineliminable, a propensity interpretation of probability, and realism. I point out some internal problems in these positions and show that the relationship between determinism, eliminability, realism, and the interpretation of probability is more complex than previously assumed in this debate. Furthermore, I take some initial steps towards a more adequate account of the statistical character of evolutionary theory|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Christian Hennig (2007). Falsification of Propensity Models by Statistical Tests and the Goodness-of-Fit Paradox. Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):166-192.
John Pollock (1992). The Theory of Nomic Probability. Synthese 90 (2):263 - 299.
John L. Pollock (1992). The Theory of Nomic Probability. Synthese 90 (2):263 - 299.
Barbara L. Horan (1994). The Statistical Character of Evolutionary Theory. Philosophy of Science 61 (1):76-95.
Leslie Graves, Barbara L. Horan & Alex Rosenberg (1999). Is Indeterminism the Source of the Statistical Character of Evolutionary Theory? Philosophy of Science 66 (1):140-157.
Roberta L. Millstein (2003). Interpretations of Probability in Evolutionary Theory. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1317-1328.
Jan Von Plato (1982). Probability and Determinism. Philosophy of Science 49 (1):51-66.
David N. Stamos (2001). Quantum Indeterminism and Evolutionary Biology. Philosophy of Science 68 (2):164-184.
Aidan Lyon (2010). Deterministic Probability: Neither Chance nor Credence. Synthese 182 (3):413-432.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #95,467 of 722,742 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,742 )
How can I increase my downloads?