Abstract

U ovom radu raspravljamo odnos Rawlsovog političkog liberalizma i istine. Budući da je politički liberalizam teorija koja izbjegava sva kontroverzna epistemološka i metafizička pitanja, jednako tako izbjegava i pitanje svoje istinitosti i koncept istine uopće. Usredotočili smo se na tri autora koji tvrde da politički liberalizam ne može izbjeći pitanje istine. Prvi autor je perfekcionist, Joseph Raz, koji pokušava pokazati da je Rawlsova teorija nekoherentna ukoliko se ne bavi pitanjem istinitosti neke moralne doktrine na kojoj mora počivati. Drugi, David Estlund, tvrdi da je teorija filozofski neodrživa ako se ne poziva na istinitost svog fundamentalnog načela. Treći, Joshua Cohen, pokazuje nemogućnost izbjegavanja nekog koncepta istine ako se u političkoj teoriji pozivamo na vjerovanja i opravdanje. Nastojimo dokazati tvrdnju o praktičko-političkoj i filozofskoj ograničenosti njihove kritike Rawlsove teorije. Temeljna intencija članka je opovrgnuti kritike koje se upućuju Rawlsu te time ojačati njegov prijedlog političkog liberalizma. Pri tome nastojimo i nadopuniti nedorečenosti u Rawlsovom prijedlogu te zbog toga nudimo preciznije određenu sliku političkog liberalizma u odnosu na njegovu izvornu.In this paper we discuss the relation between Rawls’ political liberalism and truth. Since political liberalism is a theory that avoids all controversial epistemological and metaphysical questions, it equally avoids the question of its truth and a concept of truth generally. We are focusing on three authors which claim that political liberalism can not avoid the question of truth. First, Joseph Raz, a perfectionist who claims that Rawls’ political theory is incoherent unless it is not concerned with the truth of some moral doctrine on which it must be derived. Second, David Estlund, who claims that Rawls’ theory is philosophically untenable unless it does not consider its fundamental principle as true one. Third, Joshua Cohen, indicates the impossibility of avoiding some concept of truth if political theory is invoking concepts such as beliefs and justification. We are pointing on theirs practical-political and philosophical limited range in criticizing Rawls’ theory. The basic intention of the article is to confute criticisms addressed to Rawls and, in this way, to strengthen his proposal of political liberalism. At the same time, we try to resolve issues deriving from indeterminacies in Rawls’ proposal. For this reason we offer a picture of political liberalism that is more determinate than his original proposal