Switch to: References

Citations of:

Quine's Conception of Explication – and Why It Isn't Carnap's

In Ernie Lepore & Gilbert Harman (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 508–525 (2013)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering.Georg Brun - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1211-1241.
    Taking Carnap’s classic exposition as a starting point, this paper develops a pragmatic account of the method of explication, defends it against a range of challenges and proposes a detailed recipe for the practice of explicating. It is then argued that confusions are involved in characterizing explications as definitions, and in advocating precising definitions as an alternative to explications. Explication is better characterized as conceptual re-engineering for theoretical purposes, in contrast to conceptual re-engineering for other purposes and improving exactness for (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   99 citations  
  • Realitäten entfalten: Explikationsverständnisse als Grundlage der Begriffsgestaltung.Cyrill Mamin - 2023 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 71 (6):857-888.
    This paper is concerned with the relationship between paradigms of explication and the practice of conceptual engineering. It defends three interrelated claims: First, the predominant functionalist attitude in the present debate on conceptual engineering is due to its roots in Carnapian explication, which identifies the explicandum with a precursor concept. Second, alternative metaphysical paradigms of explication locate the explicandum in a part of a concept-independent reality (‘field explication‘, as I will call it). Third, field explication may be a better paradigm (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Scientific Philosophy and the Critique of Metaphysics from Russell to Carnap to Quine.Sean Morris - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):773-799.
    In his “Wissenschaftslogik: The Role of Logic in the Philosophy of Science,” Michael Friedman argues that Carnap’s philosophy of science “is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools of mathematical logic to dissolve rather [than] solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine”. In this paper, I take issue with this claim, arguing that Quine, too, is a part of this anti-metaphysical tradition. I begin in section I (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations