Abstract

Based on the description of the real structure of our conception of the world, P. F. Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics, similar to Kant’s empirical Realism, deals with determining the limitations of empirical knowledge of the world. In this case, Kant’s transcendental Idealism seems to be an incoherent doctrine which can yield a skepticism which the critical philosophy seeks to solve. Strawson rejects Kant’s Transcendental Idealism in that it considers two limits, which leads to the paradox of delimitation. Yet, the question is: Can Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics depict the limitations of our knowledge without considering both limits? It seems that he has adopted a language that chains us to some metaphysical constraint, which is opposed to the sketch of the descriptive metaphysics. Thus, he is engaged in the same paradox which he discovered in Kant. It seems that thinking on the limit is essentially paradoxical; so skepticism can not be solved by appealing to it.