¿Puede un dualismo naturalista resolver el problema de la ineficacia causal de lo mental?

Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 28 (2):285-303 (2003)

In this article I defend two theses related to the ontology of the mind and the conception of explanatory levels supposed by evolutionary psychology. First, that the theory of mind adopted by this program can not remove all dualist remnant and present an acceptable picture of mind-body relationship. Second, that the difficulties presented by the ontological hypothesis, in addition to certain plausible theses on the explanatory compatibility, reduce in wide measure the attractiveness of pluralism of levels defended
Keywords Fuerza explicativa  Clausura causal del mundo físico  Dualism  Explanatory power  Dualismo  Mental causation  Causación mental  Causal closure of the physical domain
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 44,327
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
25 ( #350,253 of 2,271,522 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #826,846 of 2,271,522 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature