Complexity, meaning and the cartesian cut

Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):168-181 (1994)
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Abstract

The relevance of the Cartesian cut as a conceptual tool to separate matter and mind in the tradition of a dualistic world view is addressed. Modern science has developed an increasing number of concepts requiring that such a cut be considered neither as a priori prescribed nor as impenetrable. Two important examples are the concepts of complexity and meaning. They are subjects of physics as the science of matter and cognitive science as the science of the mind, respectively. Their mutual relationships are discussed to some detail, and certain elements of a `post-Cartesian' way of thinking are indicated

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