Abstract

Abstract A phenomenological distinction is drawn between what is imaginable and what is conceivable (but not imaginable). This distinction is rooted, historically, in Descartes’ famous discussion of the piece of wax, and he describes as the difference between “imagination” and “intellection.” His example is described, but then the distinction is extended to a number of unexpected other kinds of cases. One is the experience of a native speaker of her own words. She can conceive of these words meaning differently than they do but she can’t imagine this. So too, those brought up with forks can’t imagine experiencing them as objects without a function; although an experience like that is conceivable. The final class of important examples is the conceivability of borders of objects being elsewhere than we experience them to be. One surprising result of the analysis of these examples in this paper is that what’s conceivable isn’t a guide to metaphysical possibility; it’s not even a guide to possible experience.