On what it takes for there to be no fact of the matter

Noûs 42 (4):753-769 (2008)
Abstract
Philosophers are very fond of making non-factualist claims—claims to the effect that there is no fact of the matter as to whether something is the case. But can these claims be coherently stated in the context of classical logic? Some care is needed here, we argue, otherwise one ends up denying a tautology or embracing a contradiction. In the end, we think there are only two strategies available to someone who wants to be a non-factualist about something, and remain within the province of classical logic. But one of these strategies is rather controversial, and the other requires substantially more work than is often supposed. Being a non-factualist is no easy business, and it may not be the most philosophically perspicuous way to go.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00700.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,813
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1978 - Harvard University Press.
Philosophy of Logic.W. V. Quine - 1970 - Harvard University Press.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Validity for Strong Pluralists.Aaron J. Cotnoir - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):563-579.
Non‐Factualism Versus Nominalism.Matteo Plebani - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Matter, Form, and Individuation.Jeffrey E. Brower - 2011 - In Brian Davies & Eleonore Stump (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas. Oxford University Press. pp. 85-103.
On the Possibility of Indeterminacy.David Brian Barnett - 2003 - Dissertation, New York University
Toward a Distributed Computation Model of Extended Cognition.Thomas W. Polger - 2010 - APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers, 10 (1):16-20.
Conventions and Coreferentiality.Rod Bertolet - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Research 19:257-262.
Conventionalism About Space and Time.Richard Swinburne - 1980 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (3):255-272.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
927 ( #977 of 2,202,697 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #20,466 of 2,202,697 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature