Synthese (forthcoming)

Authors
Sam Baron
Australian Catholic University
Kristie Miller
University of Sydney
Michael Rubin
University of Western Australia
1 more
Abstract
This paper focuses on a particular kind of non-naturalism: moral non-naturalism. Our primary aim is to argue that the moral non-naturalist places herself in an invidious position if she simply accepts that the non-natural moral facts that she posits are not explanatory. This has, hitherto, been the route that moral non-naturalists have taken. They have attempted to make their position more palatable by pointing out that there is reason to be suspicious of the explanatory criterion of ontological commitment. That is because other perfectly respectable views fall foul of that criterion, most notably: mathematical realism. Since we don’t want to rule out mathematical realism, we should jettison the explanatory criterion of ontological commitment. Against this manoeuvre, we argue that many contemporary mathematical realists accept the explanatory criterion and provide an account of how mathematical objects are indeed indispensable to our best explanations. Thus, the moral non-naturalist will be left in an awkward dialectical position if she accepts that non-natural moral properties play no such explanatory role.
Keywords explanation  moral explanation  naturalism  non-naturalism  non-causal explanation
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02341-3
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On What Grounds What.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In David Manley, David J. Chalmers & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):306-310.

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