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Derek Parfit [93]Derek A. Parfit [1]
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  1. Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
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  2.  28
    On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    This is a major work in moral philosophy, the long-awaited follow-up to Parfit's 1984 classic Reasons and Persons, a landmark of twentieth-century philosophy. Parfit now presents a powerful new treatment of reasons and a critical examination of the most prominent systematic moral theories, leading to his own ground-breaking conclusion.
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  3.  55
    On What Matters: Volume Three.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Derek Parfit presents the third volume of On What Matters, his landmark work of moral philosophy. Parfit develops further his influential treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. He engages with his critics, and shows the way to resolution of their differences.
  4. Personal identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
  5. Equality and priority.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Ratio 10 (3):202–221.
  6.  84
    Equality or Priority?Derek Parfit - 2001 - In John Harris (ed.), Bioethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 81-125.
    One of the central debates within contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy concerns how to formulate an egalitarian theory of distributive justice which gives coherent expression to egalitarian convictions and withstands the most powerful anti-egalitarian objections. This book brings together many of the key contributions to that debate by some of the world’s leading political philosophers: Richard Arneson, G.A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, John Rawls, T.M. Scanlon, and Larry Temkin.
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  7. Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    An argument against the bias towards the near; how a defence of temporal neutrality is not a defence of S; an appeal to inconsistency; why we should reject S and accept CP.
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  8.  67
    We Are Not Human Beings.Derek Parfit - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (1):5-28.
    We can start with some science fiction. Here on Earth, I enter the Teletransporter. When I press some button, a machine destroys my body, while recording the exact states of all my cells. This information is sent by radio to Mars, where another machine makes, out of organic materials, a perfect copy of my body. The person who wakes up on Mars seems to remember living my life up to the moment when I pressed the button, and is in every (...)
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  9. Future People, the Non‐Identity Problem, and Person‐Affecting Principles.Derek Parfit - 2017 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 45 (2):118-157.
    Suppose we discover how we could live for a thousand years, but in a way that made us unable to have children. Everyone chooses to live these long lives. After we all die, human history ends, since there would be no future people. Would that be bad? Would we have acted wrongly? Some pessimists would answer No. These people are saddened by the suffering in most people’s lives, and they believe it would be wrong to inflict such suffering on others (...)
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  10. What We Together Do.Derek Parfit - manuscript
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  11.  54
    Reasons and motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.
    When we have a normative reason, and we act for that reason, it becomes our motivating reason. But we can have either kind of reason without having the other. Thus, if I jump into the canal, my motivating reason was provided by my belief; but I had no normative reason to jump. I merely thought I did. And, if I failed to notice that the canal was frozen, I had a reason not to jump that, because it was unknown to (...)
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  12. Overpopulation and the Quality of Life.Derek Parfit - 2013 - In Muresan Valentin & Majima Shunzo (eds.), Applied Ethics: Perspectives from Romania. Center for Applied Ethics and Philosophy, Hokkaido University. pp. 145-164.
    How many people should there be? Can there be overpopulation: too many people living? I shall present a puzzling argument about these questions, show how this argument can be strengthened, then sketch a possible reply.
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  13. Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion?Derek Parfit - 2016 - Theoria 82 (2):110-127.
    According to the Repugnant Conclusion: Compared with the existence of many people who would all have some very high quality of life, there is some much larger number of people whose existence would be better, even though these people would all have lives that were barely worth living. I suggest some ways in which we might be able to avoid this conclusion. I try to defend a strong form of lexical superiority.
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  14.  39
    Personal Identity.Derek Parfit - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  15. Rationality and Reasons.Derek Parfit - unknown
    When Ingmar and I discuss metaphysics or morality, our views are seldom far apart. Hut on the subjects of this paper, rationality and reasons, we deeply disagree.
     
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  16.  33
    Reasons and Motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1):99-130.
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  17.  37
    Another Defence of the Priority View.Derek Parfit - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (3):399-440.
    This article discusses the relation between prioritarian and egalitarian principles, whether and why we need to appeal to both kinds of principle, how prioritarians can answer various objections, especially those put forward by Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve, the moral difference between cases in which our acts could affect only one person or two or more people, veil of ignorance contractualism and utilitarianism, what prioritarians should claim about cases in which the effects of our acts are uncertain, the relative moral (...)
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  18.  40
    On What Matters: Volume Two.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    This is the second volume of a major new work in moral philosophy. It starts with critiques of Derek Parfit's work by four eminent moral philosophers, and his responses. The largest part of the volume is a self-contained monograph on normativity. The final part comprises seven new essays on Kant, reasons, and why the universe exists.
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  19.  33
    Future generations: Further problems.Derek Parfit - 1982 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (2):113-172.
  20. The unimportance of identity.Derek Parfit - 1997 - In H. Harris (ed.), Identity. Oxford University Press. pp. 13-45.
    We can start with some science fiction. Here on Earth, I enter the Teletransporter. When I press some button, a machine destroys my body, while recording the exact states of all my cells. The information is sent by radio to Mars, where another machine makes, out of organic materials, a perfect copy of my body. The person who wakes up on Mars seems to remember living my life up to the moment when I pressed the button, and he is in (...)
     
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  21.  45
    Justifiability to each person.Derek Parfit - 2003 - Ratio 16 (4):368–390.
    sonable, in this sense, if we ignore, or give too little weight to, some other people's well-being or moral claims.' Some critics have suggested that, because Scanlon appeals to this sense of 'reasonable', his formula is empty. On this objection, whenever we believe that some act is wrong, we shall believe that people have moral claims not to be treated in this way. We could therefore argue that such acts are disallowed by some principle which no one could reasonably reject, (...)
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  22.  23
    Overpopulation and the quality of life.Derek Parfit - 2008 - In Jesper Ryberg (ed.), The repugnant conclusion. pp. 7-22.
    How many people should there be? Can there be overpopulation: too many people living? I shall present a puzzling argument about these questions, show how this argument can be strengthened, then sketch a possible reply.
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  23.  24
    Innumerate ethics.Derek Parfit - 1978 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (4):285-301.
    Suppose that we can help either one person or many others. Is it a reason t0 help the many that We should thus be helping more people? John Taurek thinks not. We may learn from his arguments.
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  24. Climbing the Mountain.Derek Parfit - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
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  25. Normativity.Derek Parfit - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:325-80.
     
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  26.  24
    Comments.Derek Parfit - 1986 - Ethics 96 (4):832-872.
  27. Later selves and moral principles.Derek Parfit - 1973 - In Alan Montefiore (ed.), Philosophy and personal relations. Montreal,: McGill- Queen's University Press.
     
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  28. Why Anything? Why This?Derek Parfit - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  29.  30
    Lewis, Perry, and what matters.Derek Parfit - 1976 - In Amélie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
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  30. Divided minds and the nature of persons.Derek A. Parfit - 1987 - In Colin Blakemore & Susan Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity, and Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 19-26.
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  31.  33
    Personal identity and rationality.Derek Parfit - 1982 - Synthese 53 (2):227-241.
    There are two main views about the nature of personal identity. I shall briehy describe these views, say without argument which I believe to be true, and then discuss the implications of this view for one of the main conceptions of rationality. This conception I shall call "C1assical Prudence." I shall argue that, on what I believe to be the true view about personal identity, Classical Prudence is indefensible.
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  32.  11
    Experiences, subjects, and conceptual schemes.Derek Parfit - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):217-70.
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  33. Justifiability to Each Person.Derek Parfit - 2004 - In Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), On What We Owe to Each Other. Blackwell. pp. 67-89.
     
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  34.  46
    Experiences, Subjects, and Conceptual Schemes.Derek Parfit - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):217-270.
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  35.  13
    Selfless Persons.Steven Collins & Derek Parfit - 1986 - Philosophy East and West 36 (3):289-298.
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  36.  36
    On the importance of self-identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (October):683-90.
  37. Normativity.Derek Parfit - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Oxford University Press.
     
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  38. Prudence, Morality, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma‹.Derek Parfit - 1981 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    "From the Proceedings of the British Academy, London, volume LXV (1979)" - title page. Series: Henrietta Hertz Trust annual philosophical lecture -- 1978 Other Titles: Proceedings of the British Academy. Vol.65: 1979.
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  39. The Puzzle of Reality: Why Does the Universe Exist?Derek Parfit - 1992 - In Peter van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 418-427.
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  40. Equality and priority.Derek Parfit - 2002 - In Derek Matravers & Jonathan Pike (eds.), Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Routledge, in Association with the Open University.
     
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  41. Later Selves and Moral Principles.Derek Parfit - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 2: Theories About How We Should Live. Oxford University Press UK.
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  42. Persons, bodies, and human beings.Derek Parfit - 2008 - In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary debates in metaphysics. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
     
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  43.  27
    The indeterminacy of identity: A reply to Brueckner.Derek Parfit - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (1):23 - 33.
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  44.  49
    Is common-sense morality self-defeating?Derek Parfit - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (10):533-545.
    When is a moral theory self-defeating? I suggest the following. There are certain things we ought to try to achieve. Call these our moral aims. Our moral theory would be self-defeating if we believed we ought to do what will cause our moral aims to be worse achieved. Is this ever true? If so, what does it show?
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  45.  20
    Later selves and moral principles.Derek Parfit - 1973 - In Alan Montefiore (ed.), Philosophy and Personal Relations: An Anglo-French Study. Montreal,: McGill-Queen's University Press. pp. 137-169.
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  46.  13
    What we could rationally will.Derek Parfit - 2002 - The Tanner Lectures on Human Values.
    DEREK PARFIT is senior research fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. He regularly teaches there and is also afŠliated with New York University and Harvard. He was educated at Oxford and was a Harkness Fellow at Columbia and Harvard. He has been a visiting professor at Princeton, Temple, Rice, and the University of Colorado at Boulder, and is a fellow of the British Academy and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has made major contributions to our understanding (...)
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  47.  17
    Iv Lewis, Perry, and What Matters.Derek Parfit - 1976 - In Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 91-108.
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  48.  33
    Why our identity is not what matters.Derek Parfit - 2003 - In Raymond Martin & John Barresi (eds.), Personal identity. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 115--143.
    Presents actual cases of brain bisection; how we might be able to divide and reunite our minds; what explains the unity of consciousness at any time; the imagined case of full division, in which each half of our brain would be successfully transplanted into the empty skull of another body; why neither of the resulting people would be us; why this would not matter, since our relation to each of these people contains what matters in the prudential sense, giving us (...)
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  49.  14
    Postscript.Derek Parfit - 2008 - In Jesper Ryberg (ed.), The repugnant conclusion. pp. 387-388.
    The reasoning in this anthology shows how hard it is to form acceptable theories in cases that involve different numbers of people. That's highly important. And it gives us ground for worry about our appeal to particular theories in the other two kinds of case: those which involve the same numbers, in the different outcomes, though these are not all the same people, and those which do involve all and only the same people. But there is still a clear distinction (...)
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  50.  33
    Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons.Derek Parfit - 2016 - In Susan Schneider (ed.), Science Fiction and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 91–98.
    This chapter discusses problems for informational patternism and the popular soul theory of personal identity, suggests that they are incoherent, and urges that the self does not really exist. It employs the science fiction pseudotechnology of a teleporter and presents the example of split brains from actual neuroscience cases. There are two theories about what persons are, and what is involved in a person's continued existence over time. On the Ego Theory, a person's continued existence cannot be explained except as (...)
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