Minds and Machines 20 (1):19-27 (2010)

Authors
Axel Barceló
Institute Of Philosophy, Mexico
Abstract
Is there a notion of domain specificity which affords genuine insight in the context of the highly modular mind, i.e. a mind which has not only input modules, but also central ‘conceptual’ modules? Our answer to this question is no. The main argument is simple enough: we lay out some constraints that a theoretically useful notion of domain specificity, in the context of the highly modular mind, would need to meet. We then survey a host of accounts of what domain specificity is, based on the intuitive idea that a domain specific mechanism is restricted in the kind of information that it processes, and show that each fails at least one of those constraints.
Keywords Central systems   Cognitive modularity   Domain-specificity   Information restrictions
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DOI 10.1007/s11023-010-9183-1
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References found in this work BETA

The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Dual Process Theories Versus Massive Modularity Hypotheses.Angeles Eraña - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):855-872.

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