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  1. added 2019-01-17
    Semantic and Pragmatic Integration in Vision for Action.Silvano Zipoli Caiani & Gabriele Ferretti - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:40-54.
    According to an influential view, the detection of action possibilities and the selection of a plan for action are two segregated steps throughout the processing of visual information. This classical approach is committed with the assumption that two independent types of processing underlie visual perception: the semantic one, which is at the service of the identification of visually presented objects, and the pragmatic one which serves the execution of actions directed to specific parts of the same objects. However, as our (...)
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  2. added 2019-01-14
    Systemic Functional Adaptedness and Domain-General Cognition: Broadening the Scope of Evolutionary Psychology.Michael Lundie - 2019 - Biology and Philosophy 34 (1):8.
    Evolutionary psychology tends to be associated with a massively modular cognitive architecture. On this framework of human cognition, an assembly of specialized information processors called modules developed under selection pressures encountered throughout the phylogenic history of hominids. The coordinated activity of domain-specific modules carries out all the processes of belief fixation, abstract reasoning, and other facets of central cognition. Against the massive modularity thesis, I defend an account of systemic functional adaptedness, according to which non-modular systems emerged because of adaptive (...)
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  3. added 2018-09-01
    Skepticism and Evolution.N. Ángel Pinillos - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    I develop a cognitive account of how humans make skeptical judgments (of the form “X does not know p”). In my view, these judgments are produced by a special purpose metacognitive "skeptical" mechanism which monitors our reasoning for hasty or overly risky assumptions. I argue that this mechanism is modular and shaped by natural selection. The explanation for why the mechanism is adaptive essentially relies on an internalized principle connecting knowledge and action, a principle central to pragmatic encroachment theories. I (...)
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  4. added 2018-08-31
    What Basic Emotions Really Are: Encapsulated or Integrated?Isaac Wiegman - manuscript
    While there is ongoing debate about the existence of basic emotions and about their status as natural kinds, these debates usually carry on under the assumption that BEs are encapsulated from cognition and that this is one of the criteria that separates the products of evolution from the products of culture and experience. I aim to show that this assumption is entirely unwarranted, that there is empirical evidence against it, and that evolutionary theory itself should not lead us to expect (...)
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  5. added 2018-06-07
    A Unified Cognitive Model of Visual Filling-In Based on an Emergic Network Architecture.David Pierre Leibovitz - 2013 - Dissertation, Carleton University
    The Emergic Cognitive Model (ECM) is a unified computational model of visual filling-in based on the Emergic Network architecture. The Emergic Network was designed to help realize systems undergoing continuous change. In this thesis, eight different filling-in phenomena are demonstrated under a regime of continuous eye movement (and under static eye conditions as well). -/- ECM indirectly demonstrates the power of unification inherent with Emergic Networks when cognition is decomposed according to finer-grained functions supporting change. These can interact to raise (...)
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  6. added 2018-04-24
    What Can Information Encapsulation Tell Us About Emotional Rationality?Raamy Majeed - forthcoming - In Laura Candiotto (ed.), The Value of Emotions for Knowledge. Palgrave Macmillan.
    What can features of cognitive architecture, e.g. the information encapsulation of certain emotion processing systems, tell us about emotional rationality? de Sousa proposes the following hypothesis: “the role of emotions is to supply the insufficiency of reason by imitating the encapsulation of perceptual modes” (de Sousa 1987: 195). Very roughly, emotion processing can sometimes occur in a way that is insensitive to what an agent already knows, and such processing can assist reasoning by restricting the response-options she considers. This paper (...)
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  7. added 2018-02-17
    Broadening the Mind.John Perry - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):223-231.
    The main topic of Jerry Fodor’s The Elm and the Expert,1, and the title of the first chapter, is “If Psychological processes are computational, how can psychological laws be intentional?” I focus on the first and second chapters; The first is devoted to setting up the question, the second to answering it.
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  8. added 2018-02-16
    The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents.Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press USA.
    This is the first volume of a projected three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The extent to which the mind is innate is one of the central questions in the human sciences, with important implications for many surrounding debates. By bringing together the top nativist scholars in philosophy, psychology, and allied disciplines these volumes provide a comprehensive assessment of nativist thought and a definitive reference point for future nativist inquiry. The Innate Mind: Structure and Content, concerns the fundamental architecture (...)
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  9. added 2017-11-17
    Réplica a Ángeles Eraña "Dos explicaciones alternativas del cambio conceptual".Martin Francisco Fricke - 2009 - In Ángeles Eraña & Gisela Mateos González (eds.), La cognición como proceso cultural. México, D.F.: UNAM, Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinarias en Ciencias y Humanidades. pp. 91-98.
  10. added 2017-05-02
    Modularity and the Predictive Mind.Zoe Drayson - 2017 - T. Metzinger and W. Weise, (Eds), Philosophy and Predictive Processing.
    Modular approaches to the architecture of the mind claim that some mental mechanisms, such as sensory input processes, operate in special-purpose subsystems that are functionally independent from the rest of the mind. This assumption of modularity seems to be in tension with recent claims that the mind has a predictive architecture. Predictive approaches propose that both sensory processing and higher-level processing are part of the same Bayesian information-processing hierarchy, with no clear boundary between perception and cognition. Furthermore, it is not (...)
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  11. added 2017-03-10
    What Cognitive Science of Religion Can Learn From John Dewey.Hans Van Eyghen - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (3):387-406.
    Cognitive science of religion is a fairly young discipline with the aim of studying the cognitive basis of religious belief. Despite the great variation in theories a number of common features can be distilled and most theories can be situated in the cognitivist and modular paradigm. In this paper, I investigate how cognitive science of religion (CSR) can be made better by insights from John Dewey. I chose Dewey because he offered important insights in cognition long before there was cognitive (...)
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  12. added 2017-02-22
    Cognitive Penetration and Attention.Steven Gross - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8:1-12.
    Zenon Pylyshyn argues that cognitively driven attentional effects do not amount to cognitive penetration of early vision because such effects occur either before or after early vision. Critics object that in fact such effects occur at all levels of perceptual processing. We argue that Pylyshyn’s claim is correct—but not for the reason he emphasizes. Even if his critics are correct that attentional effects are not external to early vision, these effects do not satisfy Pylyshyn’s requirements that the effects be direct (...)
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  13. added 2017-02-15
    How Steven Pinker's Mind Works. [REVIEW]Roger Bissell - 1998 - Reason Papers 23:117-131.
  14. added 2017-02-15
    Is Judged Displacement a Modular Process.T. L. Hubbard & J. J. Bharucha - 1990 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 28 (6):518-518.
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  15. added 2017-02-14
    Seeing and Conceptualizing: Modularity and the Shallow Contents of Perception.Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):267-283.
    After presenting evidence about categorization behavior, this paper argues for the following theses: 1) that there is a border between perception and cognition; 2) that the border is to be characterized by perception being modular (and cognition not being so); 3) that perception outputs conceptualized representations, so views that posit that the output of perception is solely non-conceptual are false; and 4) that perceptual content consists of basic-level categories and not richer contents.
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  16. added 2017-02-14
    Developmental Studies and the Domain-Specificity of Belief Reasoning.Ian A. Apperly, Dana Samson & Glyn W. Humphreys - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (12):572-577.
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  17. added 2017-02-14
    Comparative Limb Development as a Tool for Understanding the Evolutionary Diversification of Limbs in Arthropods: Challenging the Modularity Paradigm.Lisa M. Nagy & Terri A. Williams - 2001 - In G. P. Wagner (ed.), The Character Concept in Evolutionary Biology. Academic Press. pp. 455--488.
  18. added 2017-02-14
    The Context-Sensitive Cognitive Architecture DUAL.B. Kokinov - 1994 - In Ashwin Ram & Kurt Eiselt (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Erlbaum. pp. 502--507.
  19. added 2017-02-13
    Response to Marcus and Rabagliati ‘Genes and Domain Specificity’.Yulia Kovas & Robert Plomin - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (9):398.
  20. added 2017-02-13
    Genes and Domain Specificity.Gary F. Marcus & Hugh Rabagliati - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (9):397-398.
  21. added 2017-02-13
    Infant Music Perception: Domain-General or Domain-Specific Mechanisms?Sandra E. Trehub & Erin E. Hannon - 2006 - Cognition 100 (1):73-99.
  22. added 2017-02-13
    Cognitive Architecture and Descent with Modification☆.G. Marcus - 2006 - Cognition 101 (2):443-465.
  23. added 2017-02-13
    Core Mechanisms in ‘Theory of Mind’.Alan M. Leslie, Ori Friedman & Tim P. German - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (12):528-533.
    Our ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of other people does not initially develop as a theory but as a mechanism. The ‘ theory of mind ’ mechanism is part of the core architecture of the human brain, and is specialized for learning about mental states. Impaired development of this mechanism can have drastic effects on social learning, seen most strikingly in the autistic spectrum disorders. ToMM kick-starts belief–desire attribution but effective reasoning about belief contents depends on a process (...)
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  24. added 2017-02-13
    Why Theories About Developmental Dyslexia Require Developmental Designs.Usha Goswami - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (12):534-540.
  25. added 2017-02-13
    Specialized Behaviour Without Specialized Modules.Amit Almor - 2003 - In David E. Over (ed.), Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate. Psychology Press. pp. 101--119.
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  26. added 2017-02-13
    Computational Studies of the Development of Functionally Specialized Neural Modules.Robert A. Jacobs - 1999 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):31-38.
  27. added 2017-02-13
    Genes, Proteins and Domain-Specificity.G. Marcus - 1999 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (10):367.
  28. added 2017-02-13
    A Test of Central Coherence Theory: Linguistic Processing in High-Functioning Adults with Autism or Asperger Syndrome: Is Local Coherence Impaired?Therese Jolliffe & Simon Baron-Cohen - 1999 - Cognition 71 (2):149-185.
  29. added 2017-02-13
    Changes in Social Conceptual Development: Domain Specific Structures, Self-Organization and Indeterminism.Maria Legerstee - 1997 - In Alan Fogel, Maria C. D. P. Lyra & Jaan Valsiner (eds.), Dynamics and Indeterminism in Developmental and Social Processes. L. Erlbaum. pp. 245--260.
  30. added 2017-02-13
    An Innate Language Faculty Needs Neither Modularity nor Localization.Derek Bickerton - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (4):631-632.
  31. added 2017-02-13
    Parallel Distributed Processing Challenges the Strong Modularity Hypothesis, Not the Locality Assumption.David C. Plaut - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):77.
  32. added 2017-02-13
    Diagnostics for Domain-Specific Constraints.Julia Grant & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):621-622.
  33. added 2017-02-13
    The Assumptions of an Interactive-Modular Model of the Brain.Roger L. Mellgren - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (1):127.
  34. added 2017-02-13
    Language Mechanisms and Reading Disorder: A Modular Approach.Donald Shankweiler & Stephen Crain - 1986 - Cognition 24 (1-2):139-168.
  35. added 2017-02-13
    The Proper Domain of Neuroethology.Horst D. Steklis - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (3):401.
  36. added 2017-02-13
    Fodor Flawed.Gareth Evans - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):79.
  37. added 2017-02-13
    Fodor's Guide to Cognitive Psychology.Jerrold J. Katz - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):85.
  38. added 2017-02-12
    Disassembling the Mind? A Review of Gary Marcus's Kluge: The Haphazard Construction of the Human Mind.Christian Beenfeldt - 2010 - Think 9 (25):47-56.
    The main thesis of Kluge is that the human mind is an evolutionary kluge . As Gary Marcus informs us, the term was popularized by Jackson Granholm's 1962 article ‘How to Design a Kludge’ where it was defined as ‘an ill-assorted collection of poorly matching parts, forming a distressing whole’. A kluge may be clumsy and inelegant but, surprisingly, it works . And the mind, according to Marcus, is ‘[t]he most fantastic kluge of them all’. Unlike the view of the (...)
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  39. added 2017-02-11
    Modular First-Order Ontologies Via Repositories.Michael Grüninger, Torsten Hahmann, Ali Hashemi, Darren Ong & Atalay Ozgovde - 2012 - Applied Ontology 7 (2):169-209.
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  40. added 2017-02-11
    Reuse in the Brain and Elsewhere.Björn Lindblom - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):282-283.
    Chemistry, genetics, physics, and linguistics all present instances of reuse. I use the example of how behavioral constraints may have contributed to the emergence of phonemic reuse. Arising from specific facts about speech production, perception, and learning, such constraints suggest that combinatorial reuse is domain-specific. This implies that it would be more prudent to view instances of neural reuse not as reflecting a but as a fortuitous set of converging phenomena.
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  41. added 2017-02-11
    Belling the Cat: Why Reuse Theory is Not Enough.Oscar Vilarroya - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):293-294.
    I agree with Anderson's approach to reuse theories. My main concern is twofold. Anderson assumes certain nomological regularities in reuse phenomena that are simply conjectures supported by thin evidence. On the other hand, a biological theory of reuse is insufficient, in and of itself, to address the evaluation of particular models of cognition, such as concept empiricism or conceptual metaphor.
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  42. added 2017-02-11
    Multi-Use and Constraints From Original Use.Justin A. Jungé & Daniel C. Dennett - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):277-278.
    Anderson's theory is plausible and largely consistent with the data. However, it remains underspecified on several fronts, and we highlight areas for potential improvement. Reuse is described as duplicating a functional component, preserving one function and tinkering to add another function. This is a promising model, but Anderson neglects other reasonable alternatives and we highlight several. Evidence cited in support of reuse fails to uniquely support it among a broader set of multi-use theories. We suggest that a more stringent criterion (...)
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  43. added 2017-02-11
    Reuse of Identified Neurons in Multiple Neural Circuits.Jeremy E. Niven, Lars Chittka & Michael L. Anderson - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):285.
    The growing recognition by cognitive neuroscientists that areas of vertebrate brains may be reused for multiple purposes either functionally during development or during evolution echoes a similar realization made by neuroscientists working on invertebrates. Because of these animals' relatively more accessible nervous systems, neuronal reuse can be examined at the level of individual identified neurons and fully characterized neural circuits.
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  44. added 2017-02-11
    What Constitutes a Module?Peter W. Jusczyk & Asher Cohen - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):20-21.
  45. added 2017-02-11
    Reply Module.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):33-42.
  46. added 2017-02-11
    Lexicon as Module.Mark S. Seidenberg - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):31-32.
  47. added 2017-02-11
    Suggestions for Extending the Domain of the Nashner–McCollum Theory.Barry W. Peterson - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):160-160.
  48. added 2017-02-07
    Models of Dependence and Independence: A Two-Dimensional Architecture of Dual Processing.Shira Elqayam - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):377-387.
    This theoretical note proposes a two-dimensional cognitive architecture for dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making. Evans (2007b, 2008a, 2009) distinguishes between two types of dual-processing models: parallel-competitive , in which both types of processes operate in parallel, and default-interventionist , in which heuristic processes precede the analytic processes. I suggest that this temporal dimension should be enhanced with a functional distinction between interactionist architecture, in which either type of process influences the content and valence of the other, and independent (...)
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  49. added 2017-02-07
    Is Domain-General Thinking a Domain-Specific Adaptation?Vittorio Girotto & Katya Tentori - 2008 - Mind and Society 7 (2):167-175.
    According to Kanazawa (Psychol Rev 111:512–523, 2004), general intelligence, which he considers as a synonym of abstract thinking, evolved specifically to allow our ancestors to deal with evolutionary novel problems while conferring no advantage in solving evolutionary familiar ones. We present a study whereby the results contradict Kanazawa’s hypothesis by demonstrating that performance on an evolutionary novel problem (an abstract reasoning task) predicts performance on an evolutionary familiar problem (a social reasoning task).
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  50. added 2017-02-02
    Biology and Beyond: Domain Specificity in a Broader Developmental Context.Frank Keil - manuscript
    The assumption of domain specificity has been invaluable to the study of the emergence of biological thought in young children. Yet, domains of thought must be understood within a broader context that explains how those domains relate to the surrounding cultures, to different kinds of cognitive constraints, to framing effects, to abilities to evaluate knowledge and to the ways in which domain-specific knowledge in any individual mind is related to knowledge in other minds. All of these issues must come together (...)
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1 — 50 / 438