On Some Criticisms of Hume’s Principle of Proportioning Cause to Effect

Philo 2 (2):26-40 (1999)
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Abstract

That no qualities ought to be ascribed to a cause beyond what are requisite for bringing about its effect(s) is a methodological principle Hume employs to evacuate arguments from design of much theological significance. In this article I defend Hume’s use of the principle against several objections brought against it by Richard Swinburne.

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John Beaudoin
Northern Illinois University

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