Abstract

This dissertation contributes to a theory of knowledge which incorporates both the social and the diverse natures of our knowledge. In recommending this theory, I oppose a traditional view of knowledge. That view holds that knowers must gain knowledge on their own and that they are, as knowers, identical. I argue that, although the traditional epistemology has been challenged, none of the challengers offers an epistemology which simultaneously analyzes human knowledge communication abilities and our diverse understandings of the world. Thus, in our present philosophical situation, we cannot accurately answer such questions as whether knowledge can be communicated between epistemic communities. ;Social epistemologists affirm that humans can gun knowledge through the testimony of a knower, meanwhile, difference epistemologists affirm that knowledge can differ between communities. However, social epistemologists only analyze the possibilities for testimony between mostly similar knowers, while difference epistemologists only address the existence of differing knowers, but not the potential for knowledge communication between them. Given these current investigations, it is unclear whether or not knowledge acquisition through testimony is possible when epistemic differences are present. I argue, however, that such skepticism about knowledge communication is unwarranted. I show this by producing an integrated analysis of epistemic diversity and testimony, thereby remedying the current weaknesses of both social epistemology and difference epistemology. ;In developing this analysis, I investigate anthropological case studies as sites importantly concerned with both communication and difference. Using these studies, I articulate three conditions which must hold for knowledge to be successfully communicated between communities not sharing a knowledge system. Further, I use these studies to revise philosophical understandings of both communication and difference: I reveal, as previously hidden, both the interactive nature of testimony and the presence of human epistemic similarity alongside human epistemic difference. Finally, I argue that, with these revisions, we see that the conditions for knowledge communication across epistemic difference can be met: members of differing epistemic communities can come to understand one another as knowers, they can come to understand the differences existing between them, and they can come to negotiate those differences and thereby communicate their knowledge