Because It's Right

In Morality and Self-Interest. New York: Oxford University Press (2008)
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Abstract

Morality can be painfully demanding so much so that we sometimes question the wisdom of complying with it. Indeed, according to H. A. Prichard, making this argument work is the central preoccupation of moral philosophy. But Prichard also believes that to the extent this is true, the whole subject of moral philosophy rests on a mistake. Moreover, the consensus is not only that we should call these things moral but also that we should be these things, which gives us a clue to the word's meaning. When a person refers to an act by saying, “That's immoral” listeners normally understand the speaker to be saying there is reason not to do the act. This way of understanding the term's use may not fully capture the term's meaning, any more than a set of injunctions to be kind, honest, and peaceful fully covers morality's extension.

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Paul Bloomfield
University of Connecticut

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