The Impairment Argument and Future-Like-Ours: A Problematic Dependence

Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 20 (3):353-357 (2023)
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Abstract

In response to criticism of the impairment argument for the immorality of abortion, Bruce Blackshaw and Perry Hendricks appeal to Don Marquis’s future-like-ours (FLO) account of the wrongness of killing to explain why knowingly causing fetal impairments is wrong. I argue that wedding the success of the impairment argument to FLO undermines all claims that the impairment argument for the immorality of abortion is novel. Moreover, I argue that relying on FLO when there are alternative explanations for the wrongness of causing FAS begs the question. I conclude, therefore, that the impairment argument remains unsuccessful.

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Christopher A. Bobier
Central Michigan University

Citations of this work

Ethics, Politics, and Minorities.Michael A. Ashby - 2023 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 20 (3):341-344.

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