Mind, content and information

Synthese 70 (February):205-227 (1987)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What is it that one thinks or believes when one thinks or believes something? A mental formula? A sentence in some natural language? Its truth conditions? Or perhaps an abstract proposition? The current story of content is fairly ecumenical. It says that a number of aspects, some mental, other semantic, go into our understanding of content. Yet the current story is incomplete. It leaves out a very important aspect of content, one which I call incremental information. It is information in a specific format, information as a limited or local increment, structured by a number of underlying parameters. It is in the form of such increments that information drives cognition and behavior. This is why, perhaps of all aspects of content, it is incremental information which matters most when we want to understand cognitive attitudes and performances. This in turn must have an impact on our philosophical notions of content, propositional attitudes, inference, justification and knowledge.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,774

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
159 (#25,653)

6 months
11 (#1,140,922)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Referring to events.Fred I. Dretske - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):90-99.

Add more references