Taking Up Thagard’s Challenge: A Formal Model of Conceptual Revision

Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (4):791-824 (2022)
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Abstract

Thagard presented a framework for conceptual change in science based on conceptual systems. Thagard challenged belief revision theorists, claiming that traditional belief-revision systems are able to model only the two most conservative types of changes in his framework, but not the more radical ones. The main aim of this work is to take up Thagard’s challenge, presenting a belief-revision-like system able to mirror radical types of conceptual change. We will do that with a conceptual revision system, i.e. a belief-revision-like system that takes conceptual structures as units of revisions. We will show how our conceptual revision and contraction operations satisfy analogous of the AGM postulates at the conceptual level and are able to mimic Thagard’s radical types of conceptual change.

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Author Profiles

Sena Bozdag
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Matteo De Benedetto
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

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References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
Conjectures and Refutations.K. Popper - 1963 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
Conceptual Revolutions.Paul Thagard - 1992 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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