Proposition-valued random variables as information

Synthese 175 (1):17 - 38 (2010)
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Abstract

The notion of a proposition as a set of possible worlds or states occupies central stage in probability theory, semantics and epistemology, where it serves as the fundamental unit both of information and meaning. But this fact should not blind us to the existence of prospects with a different structure. In the paper I examine the use of random variables—in particular, proposition-valued random variables— in these fields and argue that we need a general account of rational attitude formation with respect to them

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2010-03-13

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Richard Bradley
London School of Economics

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.

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