Synthese 175 (1):17 - 38 (2010)
AbstractThe notion of a proposition as a set of possible worlds or states occupies central stage in probability theory, semantics and epistemology, where it serves as the fundamental unit both of information and meaning. But this fact should not blind us to the existence of prospects with a different structure. In the paper I examine the use of random variables—in particular, proposition-valued random variables— in these fields and argue that we need a general account of rational attitude formation with respect to them
Similar books and articles
When coherent preferences may not preserve indifference between equivalent random variables: A price for unbounded utilities.Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark Schervish & Joseph Kadane - unknown
Preference for equivalent random variables: A price for unbounded utilities.Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish & Joseph B. Kadane - 2009 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 45:329-340.
On the equivalence of conglomerability and disintegrability for unbounded random variables.Teddy Seidenfeld - unknown
Operating on functions with variable domains.Philip G. Calabrese - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (1):1-18.
Logic, probability, and quantum theory.Arthur I. Fine - 1968 - Philosophy of Science 35 (2):101-111.
Infinitary logics and very sparse random graphs.James F. Lynch - 1997 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 62 (2):609-623.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
No citations found.
References found in this work
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs 2). Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.