Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3):293-304 (2017)
AbstractThe paper concerns the problem of the legal responsibility of autonomous machines. In our opinion it boils down to the question of whether such machines can be seen as real agents through the prism of folk-psychology. We argue that autonomous machines cannot be granted the status of legal agents. Although this is quite possible from purely technical point of view, since the law is a conventional tool of regulating social interactions and as such can accommodate various legislative constructs, including legal responsibility of autonomous artificial agents, we believe that it would remain a mere ‘law in books’, never materializing as ‘law in action’. It is not impossible to imagine that the evolution of our conceptual apparatus will reach a stage, when autonomous robots become full-blooded moral and legal agents. However, today at least, we seem to be far from this point.
Similar books and articles
Ethical Issues for Autonomous Trading Agents.Michael P. Wellman & Uday Rajan - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (4):609-624.
Out of Character: On the Creation of Virtuous Machines. [REVIEW]Ryan Tonkens - 2012 - Ethics and Information Technology 14 (2):137-149.
Theoretical Foundations for the Responsibility of Autonomous Agents.Jaap Hage - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3):255-271.
Autonomous Weapons and Distributed Responsibility.Marcus Schulzke - 2013 - Philosophy and Technology 26 (2):203-219.
The Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the Actions of Learning Automata. [REVIEW]Andreas Matthias - 2004 - Ethics and Information Technology 6 (3):175-183.
From Coder to Creator : Responsibility Issues in Intelligent Artifact Design.Andreas Matthias - unknown
The Robot Didn't Do It: A Position Paper for the Workshop on Anticipatory Ethics, Responsibility and Artificial Agents.Ronald C. Arkin - 2013 - Workshop on Anticipatory Ethics, Responsibility and Artificial Agents 2013.
Autonomous Killer Drones.Nikil Mukerji - 2016 - In Ezio Di Nucci & Filippo Santoni de Sio (eds.), Drones and Responsibility: Legal, Philosophical and Socio-Technical Perspectives on the Use of Remotely Controlled Weapons. Routledge.
Contracting Agents: Legal Personality and Representation. [REVIEW]Francisco Andrade, Paulo Novais, José Machado & José Neves - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):357-373.
An Agent View on Law.Heesen Constantijn, Homburg Vincent & Offereins Margriet - 1997 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 5 (4):323-340.
Information, Ethics, and Computers: The Problem of Autonomous Moral Agents. [REVIEW]Bernd Carsten Stahl - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (1):67-83.
A Legal Theory for Autonomous Artificial Agents by Samir Chopra and Laurence F White.D. A. Coady - 2012 - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 37 (2012):349-50.
How Autonomy Alone Debunks Corporate Moral Agency.David Rönnegard - 2013 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 32 (1-2):77-107.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
The Ethics of Crashes with Self‐Driving Cars: A Roadmap, II.Sven Nyholm - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (7):e12506.
The Spectrum of Responsibility Ascription for End Users of Neurotechnologies.Andreas Schönau - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):423-435.
Legal and Human Rights Issues of AI: Gaps, Challenges and Vulnerabilities.Rowena Rodrigues - 2020 - Journal of Responsible Technology 4:100005.
Moral Difference Between Humans and Robots: Paternalism and Human-Relative Reason.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (4):1533-1543.
Rights for Robots: Artificial Intelligence, Animal and Environmental Law (2020) by Joshua Gellers. [REVIEW]Kamil Mamak - 2021 - Science and Engineering Ethics 27 (3):1-4.
References found in this work
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):384-389.
Free Will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.