Abstract

In light of various arguments against the necessity and sufficiency of Hempel's Deductive Nomological model of explanation, I propose repairs to this model and discuss their implications for the adequacy of nomic subsumption for providing explanatory information about causes of particular occurrences. Satisfaction of the repaired model will yield a description of the cause, except in cases where there is preemption or where the description of the occurrence in question is not portrayed in such a way that is relevant to the context of the explanation. In the former case, a potential cause is provided. In the latter case, a cause is provided for the occurrence specified under the inaccurate description. ;The initial discussion concerns difficulties that arise in deciphering what is being requested when one is asked for an explanation. This is followed by a presentation of Hempel's DN model of explanation. Arguments that laws need not be present in explanation and thus that satisfaction of Hempel's model is not necessary for explanation are then presented and analyzed. Here, the work of Peter Achinstein and Jerrold Aronson is taken as representative. I argue that laws are in fact essential for explanation, because they figure in the truth conditions for causal claims, and because non-causal explanations are inherently nomological. ;Arguments against the sufficiency of Hempel's model are then considered, and in this case genuine inadequacies of the model are exposed. Among the writers discussed are Jaegwon Kim, Hilary Putnam, and Wesley Salmon. Repairs are suggested for Hempel's DN model, and the effectiveness of these repairs is assessed. Among the issues confronted are the problems raised by the use of truth-functional logic to represent a modal context; proposed counterexamples to Hempel's model that involve laws of coexistence; and instances where contraposition, epiphenomena, and preemption appear to lead to unsatisfactory DN explanations in causal context.