Williams on Ought

In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald R. Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press USA (2012)
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Abstract

In 2002, Bernard Williams delivered a lecture that revisited the arguments of his article 'Ought and moral obligation', published in his Moral Luck. The lecture attributed to the earlier article the thesis that there are no ‘personal’ or (as I put it) ‘owned’ oughts. It also rejected this thesis. This paper explains the idea of an owned ought, and supports Williams’s lecture in asserting that there are owned oughts. It also examines the question of how accurately Williams’s later lecture interprets his earlier article.

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John Broome
University Of Oxford

Citations of this work

‘Ought’ and Control.Matthew Chrisman - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):433-451.
Reason versus ought.John Broome - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):80-97.
Ought and agency.Daniel Skibra - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-40.

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