Abstract
Descartes' conception of the mind as a private entity, separable (in various ways) from the body and the world around it, has come under increasingly vigorous attack in recent years. A new and very different sort of expansion of the scope of psychology has recently been advanced by John Haugeland, who argues quite ingeniously that the Cartesian divisions between mind, body, and world are psychologically otiose. I demur, citing several traditional individuative criteria that are immune to Haugeland's case.
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