On Kim’s exclusion principle

Synthese 169 (1):75-90 (2009)
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Abstract

In this paper we explore Jaegwon Kim's principle of explanatory exclusion. Kim's support for the principle is clarified and we critically evaluate several versions of the dual explananda response authors have offered to undermine it. We argue that none of the standard versions of the dual explananda reply are entirely successful and propose an alternative approach that reveals a deep tension in Kim's metaphysics. We argue that Kim can only retain the principle of explanatory exclusion if he abandons his longstanding critique of nonreductive physicalism.

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2009-01-28

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Author Profiles

Neil Campbell
Wilfrid Laurier University
Dwayne Moore
University of Saskatchewan

References found in this work

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Events as Property Exemplifications.Jaegwon Kim - 1976 - In M. Brand & Douglas Walton (eds.), Action Theory. Reidel. pp. 310-326.
Mechanism, purpose, and explanatory exclusion.Jaegwon Kim - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:77-108.
Thinking causes.Donald Davidson - 1995 - In Pascal Engel (ed.), Mental causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 1993--3.

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