Putnam on the token-identity theory

Philosophia 27 (3-4):567-574 (1999)
Authors
Neil Campbell
Wilfrid Laurier University
Abstract
Putnam raises two objections against the token-identity theory in his _Dewey Lectures. (1) Token-physicalism invokes a mysterious or _sui generis concept of identity between mental and physical event tokens; (2) The theory suffers from explanatory failure because it cannot individuate mental events using physical criteria. I argue that the first claim is false, since Davidson adopts the same criterion of identity Quine employs for ordinary objects which invokes a concept of identity we understand clearly enough. I then show that Putnam's second complaint is an extravagant demand that needs not be answered and is at odds with his own direct realism
Keywords Epistemology  Identity  Materialism  Dewey  Hilary Putnam
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Reprint years 2006
DOI 10.1007/BF02383200
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Token Physicalism and Functional Individuation.James DiFrisco - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):309-329.

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