Putnam's intuition

Philosophical Studies 109 (2):143-70 (2002)
Abstract
Multiple realizability has recently attractedrenewed attention, for example Bickle, 1998;Bechtel and Mundale, 1999; Bechtel and McCauley,1999; Heil, 1999; and Sober, 1999. Many of thesewriters revisit the topic of multiplerealizability in order to show that someversion of a mind-brain identity theory isviable. Although there is much of value inthese recent explorations, they do not addressthe underlying intuitions that have vexedphilosophers of mind since Hilary Putnamintroduced the concern (1967). I argue that thestandard way of construing multiplerealizability is a much stronger claim thanthat of Putnam's intuition alone. I distinguishfour interpretations of the multiplerealizability intuition. Some commonformulations of multiple realizability arealmost certainly true, while others are not atall plausible. I argue that the plausible formsof multiple realizability do not impugn theprospects for a mind-brain Identity Theory.
Keywords Identity  Intuition  Metaphysics  Mind  Multiple  Realizability  Putnam, H
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DOI 10.1023/A:1016236415052
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Multiple Realizability.Eric Funkhouser - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):303–315.
Identity Theories.Thomas W. Polger - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):822-834.

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