Perversity

Philosophical Quarterly 26 (104):229-242 (1976)

Authors
L. S. Carrier
University of Miami
Abstract
I argue that there are perverse actions, in the sense that they are acts performed in the belief that they are wrong. They are also, however, acts done in the belief that they are right. What makes them perverse is, not only that they have conflicting motivations, but that the motivation that wins out is not in accord with reason. That is, a perverse act is one resulting from one's strongest motivation but not based on all one's available reasons.
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DOI 10.2307/2219015
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