Object and event concepts: A cognitive mechanism of incommensurability

Philosophy of Science 70 (5):962-974 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I examine a cognitive mechanism of incommensurability. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts, I reveal an ontological difference between object and event concepts: the former are spatial but the latter temporal. Experiments from cognitive sciences further demonstrate that the mind treats object and event concepts differently. Thus, incommensurability can occur in conceptual change across different ontological categories. I use a historical case to illustrate how the ontological difference between an object and an event concept actually caused incommensurability in the context of nineteenth‐century optics. The cognitive and historical analyses indicate that incommensurability can be a local phenomenon and does not necessarily imply incomparability.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Why did John Herschel fail to understand polarization? The differences between object and event concepts.Xiang Chen - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (3):491-513.
Kuhn, incommensurability, and cognitive science.Peter Barker - 2001 - Perspectives on Science 9 (4):433-462.
The 'platforms' for comparing incommensurable taxonomies: A cognitive-historical analysis. [REVIEW]Xiang Chen - 2002 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (1):1-22.
A different kind of revolutionary change: transformation from object to process concepts.Xiang Chen - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2):182-191.
Local Incommensurability and Communicability.Xiang Chen - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:67 - 76.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
115 (#159,322)

6 months
9 (#355,272)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?