Incommensurability naturalized

In Lena Soler, Howard Sankey & Paul Hoyningen-Huene (eds.), Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison: Stabilities, Ruptures, Incommensurabilities? Springer. pp. 21--39 (2008)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that we can understand incommensurability in a naturalistic, psychological manner. Cognitive habits can be acquired and so differ between individuals. Drawing on psychological work concerning analogical thinking and thinking with schemata, I argue that incommensurability arises between individuals with different cognitive habits and between groups with different shared cognitive habits.

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Alexander James Bird
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

Thomas Kuhn.Alexander Bird - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Beyond Structure: New Frontiers of the Philosophy of Thomas Kuhn.Vincenzo Politi & Yafeng Shan - 2023 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):81-86.
Replies.Paul Hoyningen-Huene - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):907-928.

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References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Otto Neurath.
Models and Analogies in Science.Mary B. Hesse - 1963 - [Notre Dame, Ind.]: University of Notre Dame Press.
Models and Analogies in Science.Mary B. Hesse - 1966 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 3 (3):190-191.

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