Research in Phenomenology 48 (2):197-208 (2018)

Gaetano Chiurazzi
Università degli Studi di Torino
_ Source: _Volume 48, Issue 2, pp 197 - 208 The movement of New Realism, which in Italy has been launched by Maurizio Ferraris, is conceived explicitly in opposition to Kant. In his defense of the distinction between ontology and epistemology, Ferraris starts from the presupposition that it is Kant himself who is responsible for their confusion because of his transcendental philosophy and its consequent constructionism. In this paper I will defend Kant’s perspective, explaining his reasons, even against Meillasoux’s “speculative realism.” The basic idea is that Kant’s transcendental philosophy requires a new philosophical attitude, which implies a shift from reality to possibility as the fundamental philosophical category, since only possibility enables a critical perspective on reality.
Keywords Kant   critique   hermeneutics   possibility   reality  New Realisms
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DOI 10.1163/15691640-12341391
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Thing, Object, Life.Theodore George - 2012 - Research in Phenomenology 42 (1):18-34.

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