Abstract

I offer a new understanding of Descartes’ metaphysics, arguing that his primary question is ‘what is real and true?’ – not as we have been accustomed to believe, ‘how can I be certain?’ – an inquiry that requires both reason’s authority and freedom’s autonomy. I argue that without freedom and its internal relation to reason, Descartes’ undertaking would not get off the ground; yet that relation has gone unnoticed by successive studies of his philosophy. I demonstrate that it is only when we grasp the centrality of freedom to his Meditations that we can understand what motivates key parts of his metaphysics. I present Descartes’ distinctive metaphysics of freedom and resolve what has been seen as an intractable inconsistency between his account of freedom in the Meditations, and the account of freedom he presents in the Principles I 37 and the notorious letter to Mesland (1645). I defend his compelling conception of the true unity of the self, a thinking active being, and its place in the world.