Malebranche and occasionalism: A reply to Steven Nadler

Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (3):499-504 (1995)
In Malebranche's account of occasional causality, God exercises his general will with respect to every event that merits a causal explanation. Nadler distinguishes two pictures of God's involvement; (1) there are as many distinct acts of God's will as there are causal events to be explained; (2) God's will is exercised once only, when the natural order of causes is created. I argue that Malebranche's concept of God is inconsistent with a real distinction between God and acts of his will, and with using temporal parameters to identify God's acts. Thus, Leibniz's pre-established harmony is analogous to Malebranche's occasionalist concurrence
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1353/hph.1995.0047
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,411
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Tad M. Schmaltz (2008). Occasionalism and Mechanism: Fontenelle's Objections to Malebranche. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (2):293 – 313.
Tad M. Schmaltz (2003). Cartesian Causation: Body–Body Interaction, Motion, and Eternal Truths. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (4):737-762.
Eric Stencil (2011). Malebranche and the General Will of God. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (6):1107 - 1129.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

68 ( #71,663 of 1,924,732 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #211,945 of 1,924,732 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.