Nothing but a useful tool? (F)utility and the free-energy principle

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e191 (2022)
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Abstract

Bruineberg and collaborators distinguish three philosophical positions about the status of Markov blankets in the context of active inference modelling, namely: literalism, realism, and instrumentalism. They criticize the first two positions and suggest that instrumentalism is “less problematic but also less interesting” (sect. 6.1.2, para. 5) Here, I sketch how literalists and realists might reply to Bruineberg et al.'s criticisms, and I explain why instrumentalism is more interesting and contentious than what Bruineberg and collaborators suggest.

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Matteo Colombo
Tilburg University

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Boundaries, Conventions, and Realism.Achille C. Varzi - 2011 - In Michael O'Rourke, Joseph K. Campbell & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science. MIT Press. pp. 129–153.
A New Kind of Science.Stephen Wolfram - 2002 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (1):112-114.

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