'P is true and non-Cartesian' is non-Cartesian

Analysis 68 (3):183-185 (2008)
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Roy T. Cook
University of St. Andrews

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References found in this work

Truth and other enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The taming of the true.Neil Tennant - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A logical analysis of some value concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic.Michael Dummett - 1978 - In Truth and other enigmas. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 215--247.
The Taming of the True.Michael Glanzberg & Neil Tennant - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):290.

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