In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. Cambridge: (forthcoming)

Authors
Tim Crane
Central European University
Abstract
The knowledge argument is something that is both an ideal for philosophy and yet surprisingly rare: a simple, valid argument for an interesting and important conclusion, with plausible premises. From a compelling thought-experiment and a few apparently innocuous assumptions, the argument seems to give us the conclusion, a priori, that physicalism is false. Given the apparent power of this apparently simple argument, it is not surprising that philosophers have worried over the argument and its proper diagnosis: physicalists have disputed its validity, or soundness or both; in response, non-physicalists have attempted to reformulate the argument to show its real anti-physicalist lesson.
Keywords knowledge argument
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Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2010 - Routledge.

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