Unity in the void: Reply to Revonsuo

PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10 (2004)
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Abstract

While agreeing with me on many issues, Revonsuo rejects my claim that phenomenal states could be co-conscious without being spatially related (in experience). In defence of my claim I described a thought-experiment in which

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Barry Francis Dainton
University of Liverpool

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