Beyond Favouring

In Ethics without principles. New York: Oxford University Press (2004)
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Abstract

Suggests ways of characterising the favouring relation by contrasting it with other forms of relevance, such as enabling and intensifying. Offers examples of the distinction between favouring and enabling in the theory of explanation and in epistemology.

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Jonathan Dancy
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

What Is the Point of Justice?Andrew Mason - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (4):525-547.

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