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In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 231–269 (2017)
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Abstract

There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties, which is to say that certain psychological predicates are true of them. These properties are constantly changing, and such changes are mental events. Examples are: noticing that it is time for lunch, seeing that the wind is rising, remembering the new name of Cambodia, deciding to spend next Christmas in Botswana, or developing a taste for Trollope. Mental events are, in my view, physical (which is not, of course, to say that they are not mental). This is a thesis that follows from certain premises, all of which I think are true. The main premises are.

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Consciousness Explained: Ignoring Ryle. and Co.Sonia Sedivy - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):455-483.

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