Mesh Theories and Acting Rationally (2023)

Abstract

In this paper, I consider the mesh theory of Frankfurt that moral responsibility is assessed by a meshing of first-order desires and second-order volitions. I come to argue that these second-order volitions are our rational decision-making process, and should be praised or blamed on the basis of that volition and whether the agent acted according to it.

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David Klier
Arizona State University

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Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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