Abstract
Of the three views of theoretical knowledge which form the focus of this article, the first has its source in the work of Russell, the second in Ramsey, and the third in Carnap. Although very different, all three views subscribe to a principle I formulate as ‘the structuralist thesis’; they are also naturally expressed using the concept of a Ramsey sentence. I distinguish the framework of assumptions which give rise to the structuralist thesis from an unproblematic emphasis on the importance of ‘structural’ differences for the analysis and interpretation of theories belonging to the exact sciences, and I review a number of logical properties of Ramsey sentences using very simple arithmetical theories and their models. I then develop a reconstruction of the views of Russell, Ramsey, and Carnap that clarifies the interrelationships among them by appealing to aspects of the arithmetical examples that inform my discussion of Ramsey sentences. I conclude with an account of the philosophical basis of the structuralist thesis and the fundamental difficulty to which it leads
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axq021
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References found in this work BETA

The Scientific Image.Michael Friedman - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (5):274-283.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
Realism and Reason.Hilary Putnam - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.

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Armchair Philosophy Naturalized.Sebastian Lutz - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1099-1125.

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