Enactive psychiatry and social integration: beyond dyadic interactions

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-25 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Enactive approaches to psychiatry have recently argued for an understanding of psychiatric conditions based within relational interactions between individuals and their environments. A central motivation for these enactive approaches is the goal of social integration: the integration of a naturalistic approach to psychiatric conditions with their broader sociocultural dimensions. One possible issue, however, is whether appeals to the autonomy and authenticity of relationally constituted enactive individuals can provide a means of adjudicating between harmful and beneficial social constraints upon individual behaviour. This paper seeks to provide enactive approaches to psychiatry with a possible means of evaluating normative influences of social contexts beyond direct interactions with relationally constituted individuals. Some of the most significant influences of the sociocultural dimension of psychiatric conditions consist not in direct interaction with individuals, but in setting the terms for interactions and interactants alike. Insofar as some social influences precede and predefine dyadic relations between individuals and their social context, these cannot be accounted for as features of interactions, but must be assessed as independent structures of the sociocultural dimension. I will provide one potential means for enactive models to assess social norms using Canguilhem’s distinction between health and pathology. I will argue that Canguilhem’s conceptualization of health in terms of adaptive normative structure provides a potential tool for social integration which strongly complements enactive approaches to psychiatry.

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References found in this work

Hostile Scaffolding.Ryan Timms & David Spurrett - 2023 - Philosophical Papers 52 (1):1-30.
Enactivism, other minds, and mental disorders.Joel Krueger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):365-389.
The ethics of nudging: An overview.Andreas T. Schmidt & Bart Engelen - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (4):e12658.

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